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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

TWO ESSAYS ON THE
RECOMMENDATION BEHAVIOR OF MULTI-LINE SALESPEOPLE

This dissertation consists of two essays in which we examine the recommendation
behavior of multi-line salespeople. Multi-line salespeople are those who are able to
choose among overlapping, competing manufacturers’ products to make a
recommendation to their customers. In this dissertation, we seek to explain why and how
multi-line salespeople may recommend particular products to their customers.
In the first essay, we examine why salespeople may recommend a particular
product. Manufacturers frequently face the challenge of motivating distributor
salespeople to focus efforts on their products rather than on their competitors’. Thus,
manufacturers often rely on outcome (e.g., rewards) and behavior (e.g., training) controls.
We refer to these as external controls because they reflect mechanisms by which one firm
directs another firm’s employees. External controls tend to raise concerns among
salespeople about the appropriateness of being influenced by an outside firm, which can
be alleviated by seeking cues about their managers’ external controls. The results of a
three-source, multilevel study suggests that manufacturers can enhance the ability of
salesperson external controls to drive focused effort (i.e., recommendations) by
increasing similar sales manager external controls; however, increasing dissimilar
controls may reduce the positive impact of salesperson external controls on their focused
effort.
In the second essay, we examine how salespeople may recommend a particular
product. The process of how purchase decisions are made by customers is well-known in
the literature (i.e., self decision-making); however, to date, there has not been a
complementary understanding of how purchase decisions are made for customers (i.e.,
self-other decision-making). The results from a qualitative study involving 71 covert
participant observation encounters with salespeople across 71 store locations of 3
retailers indicate a three-step recommendation process: goals, strategies, and
recommendations. Drawing upon field observations and the decision-making literature,
we show that salespeople emphasize different goals when recommending products than
customers making decisions for themselves. We also complement prior research by
expanding the scope of known decision-making strategies (self and self-other
ii

lexicographic) and surfacing a new decision-making strategy (product homogenization).
Finally, we identify three recommendation types, and link the steps in the process model
via a set of integrating propositions.

KEYWORDS: salesforce, recommendation, focused effort, external controls, self-other
decision-making
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Introduction
This dissertation consists of two essays which examine the recommendation

behavior of multi-line salespeople. Multi-line salespeople are those who are able to
choose among overlapping, competing manufacturers’ products to make a
recommendation to their customer. For example, a business-to-business salesperson may
have ten different printer manufacturers to choose from when recommending a printer to
customers, or a business-to-consumer salesperson may have six different appliance
manufacturers to choose from when recommending an electric range to customers. We
take two approaches to understanding the recommendation behavior of multi-line
salespeople: why products are recommended, and how products are recommended. In the
first essay we draw upon primary, multi-level, multi-source, empirical data to examine
external controls, and explain why salespeople recommend a particular manufacturer’s
products to customers. In the second essay, we draw upon observations from an
inductive, covert, participant observation study to examine the process of how
salespeople make recommendations for customers.
In the first essay, we examine the challenge faced by manufacturers in motivating
distributor salespeople to recommend their products rather than their competitors’
products. To address this challenge, manufacturers often rely on outcome (e.g., financial
rewards) and behavior (e.g., product training) controls. Controls are defined as “an
organization’s set of procedures for monitoring, directing, evaluating, and compensating
its employees” (Anderson and Oliver 1987, p. 76). Thus, manufacturer controls are
referred to here as external controls because they reflect mechanisms by which one firm
directs another firm’s employees. Surprisingly, despite their pervasiveness in practice,
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there is little research on external controls (for an exception see Coughlan and Joseph
2012).
External outcome control refers to the extent to which a manufacturer monitors
and provides rewards and recognition for the sales of its products by another firm’s
employees (e.g., Challagalla and Shervani 1996). The most common financial rewards
are distributor-approved SPIFs, which refer to commissions a manufacturer pays directly
to the distributor’s salesforce for sales of its products (Zoltners, Shinha, and Lorimer
2006). External behavior control refers to the extent to which a manufacturer provides
direction to another firm’s employees on the process of selling its products (e.g.,
Challagalla and Shervani 1996). Firms may focus on the process of selling by providing
direction on the activities salespeople or their managers should engage in (e.g., number of
sales calls to make) and/or by improving their capabilities through training and coaching.
External controls may be targeted to individuals within a single level (e.g.,
salespeople) or across levels (e.g., salespeople and sales managers). To date, however,
most research has focused on within-level analysis. Furthermore, the few studies
exploring external controls have focused on one type of control and within-level analysis.
As such, we address an important gap in the literature by focusing on external outcome
and behavior controls aimed at both salespeople and their managers (i.e., cross-level
controls).
In contrast with internal controls (i.e., mechanisms to direct a firm’s own
employees), salespeople are not obligated to comply with external controls, thus, have the
freedom to choose whether to accede to their influence or not. Salespeople may view
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external controls as beneficial for achieving their own goals; however external controls
may raise concerns about the appropriateness of being influenced by an outside firm. This
research draws on the legitimacy literature and on social learning theory to suggest that
salespeople are likely to look to legitimate authority figures (i.e., sales managers)
(Ahearne et al. 2013) for cues which serve to alleviate concerns and guide their behavior
(Bandura 1977; Tost 2011). We propose that an important cue to salespeople is whether
their sales manager is also influenced by these external controls.
Combining the two types of external controls (outcome and behavior) with levels
of external controls (salesperson and sales manager), yields two interactions in which
salesperson and sales manager controls are similar (i.e., both salesperson and sales
manager receive outcome control or behavior control) and two interactions in which
salesperson and sales manager controls are dissimilar (i.e., salesperson receives outcome
control and sales manager receives behavior control, or vice versa). We explore the
impact of the interaction effects of external salesperson controls and external sales
manager controls on a salesperson’s manufacturer-focused effort, or the extent to which a
salesperson pursues opportunities to sell the products of a particular manufacturer. It
reflects the effort salespeople expend in proactively looking for opportunities, seeking
customers, and making calls specifically to recommend a particular manufacturer’s
products. Although manufacturer-focused effort is important, manufacturers are also
interested in knowing whether this increased effort towards recommendations manifests
in greater sales of their products. Accordingly, we also examine the effect of focused
effort on manufacturer-focused performance, which refers to the volume of sales a
distributor salesperson obtains for a particular manufacturer’s products.
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The theoretical framework is tested using a unique data set from downstream
distributor salespeople and their sales managers recruited from an international imaging
products and solutions manufacturer with more than $4 billion in annual revenues. This
setting is particularly suitable for the study because of the industry’s (and particular
manufacturer’s) reliance on external controls. We collected the cross-level data in three
stages. First, 2,111 downstream distributor salespeople were e-mailed a description of the
study and a link to the online survey. Second, upon completion of the salesperson
surveys, we linked individual distributor salespeople to their sales managers through the
manufacturer’s database, then e-mailed sales managers a link to an online survey. Each
sales manager’s survey was tailored to include a portion that assessed the focused effort
of each of their salespeople who had previously completed a survey. Of the 2,111
distributor salespeople contacted, we received 434 responses (a 20.5% response rate).
These 434 distributor salespeople reported to 211 unique sales managers. Of these unique
sales managers, 102 responded (a 48.3% response rate). Managers reported on an average
of 1.97 salespeople; therefore, our results reflect 201 unique salesperson–manager dyads.
Third, we linked each dyad of survey responses to each salesperson’s objective sales
volume for the product category of interest from the participating manufacturer’s sales
database. Such a design accounts for the nested nature of salesperson–sales manager
relationships, reduces concerns about common method bias, and affords the opportunity
to test cross-level interactions.
The findings from our research suggest that manufacturers can enhance the ability
of salesperson external controls (outcome and behavior) to drive focused effort (i.e.,
recommendations) by increasing similar sales manager external controls (outcome and
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behavior); however, increasing sales manager external outcome control reduces the
positive impact of salespeople’s external behavior control (i.e., dissimilar controls) on
their focused effort.
In the second essay, we examine the process of how salespeople make a
recommendation to customers. The process of how decisions are made for oneself is wellknown in the literature (i.e., self decision-making); however, to date, there has not been a
complementary understanding of how decisions are made for others, as in the case of
salesperson recommendations to a customer (i.e., self-other decision-making). The selfother decision-making research which has emerged to date (e.g., Beisswanger et al. 2003;
Polman 2010; 2012; Wray and Stone 2005), tends to focus on contextual differences
between self and self-other decision-making (Beisswanger et al. 2003; Wray and Stone
2005). For example, research compares self and self-other decision-making in terms of
the amount of information sources consulted (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, and Frey 2005), the
indulgence of choices (Laran 2010), and the risk aversion of choice (Beisswanger et al.
2003). Importantly, although the literature has suggested that self and self-other decisionmaking are made via different processes, prior research has yet to explore these
differences (Lu, Xie, and Xu 2012; Wray and Stone 2005).
The insights provided in this research are based on a grounded theory approach
(e.g., Glaser and Straus 1967; Spiggle 1994; Strauss 1987; Strauss and Corbin 1990). In
particular, the first author went undercover to assume the role of a customer and engaged
in 71 selling encounters at 71 different locations with actual salespeople from large
retailers, across three different retail chains and four different states. This study involved
deception such that the retail salespeople believed that they were selling to a real
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potential customer. Such an approach allows the salesperson-customer experience to
unfold naturally (Belk, Sherry, and Wallendorf 1988), which affords a richer knowledge
of the topic area and data that is not contrived (Wilson 2001). Moreover, this approach
lends credibility to our findings by producing unfiltered, naturalistic data, which does not
suffer from informants’ limited memory recall (Finn 2001), discrepancies between
reported and actual behavior, and a variety of desirability biases that may occur with
surveys, off-site interviews, and focus groups (Friedrichs and Ludtke 1975). We covertly
audio-recorded the 71 sales encounters with retail salespeople in their natural setting (i.e.,
retail stores) (Bradford 2015; Canniford and Shankar 2013; Schouten and McAlexander
1995) as well as the first author’s observations immediately following each encounter
(Canniford and Shankar 2013; Peñaloza 1994; Tumbat and Belk 2011). The audio
recordings were transcribed by a third-party transcription service.
The findings from this research indicate a three-step recommendation process:
goals, strategies, and recommendations. Drawing upon the participant observation study
and the self and self-other decision-making literatures, we show that retail salespeople
emphasize different goals when recommending products than customers do when making
decisions for themselves. We also complement prior research by expanding the scope of
previously known decision-making strategies (self-other lexicographic, self-other equal
weighting) as well as surfacing a new decision-making strategy (product
homogenization). Finally, we identify three types of recommendations. The steps of the
process are then linked with a set of integrating propositions. Doing so provides
customers with a “roadmap” for how salespeople may come to recommend the products
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they do, such that customers can then determine the extent to which they integrate the
recommendation into their own decision-making.
Through both essays of this dissertation, we aim to examine the recommendation
behavior of multi-line salespeople; heretofore, an under-researched, yet highly prevalent
practice. Thus, this dissertation is positioned to contribute to the sales and sales
management marketing literature, as well as the self-other decision-making literature by
forwarding the external factors which influence a salesperson’s recommendation
behavior, as well as the process model of how recommendations are made.
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2

External Controls: How One Firm Governs Another Firm’s Salesforce

2.1

Introduction
Distributors frequently carry similar products from competing manufacturers

(e.g., Hughes and Ahearne 2010). For example, distributors in diverse industries such as
electronics, industrial equipment, furniture, printers, and hospital equipment tend to sell
competing products from multiple manufacturers. Consequently, distributor salespeople
can focus their efforts on selling any of the competing manufacturers’ products. A major
challenge for manufacturers, therefore, is how to motivate distributor salespeople to focus
their efforts on selling their particular products rather than on other manufacturers’
products. This challenge is particularly daunting because it involves influencing another
firm’s employees (i.e., sales force).
Manufacturers often address this challenge by relying on outcome and/or behavior
controls targeted at distributor salespeople. Outcome control refers to firms monitoring
salespeople’s sales results and rewarding them accordingly (Oliver and Anderson 1994).
For example, manufacturers such as 3M, Sony, and John Deere provide financial rewards
or special performance incentives funds (SPIFs) directly to distributor salespeople for
selling their products (Zoltners, Shinha, and Lorimer 2006) (Table 2.1). In contrast,
behavior control focuses on the process that salespeople use for generating sales (Cravens
et al. 1993). For example, manufacturers provide distributor salespeople with product
and/or sales skills training to motivate them to expend effort on selling their products.
These manufacturer outcome and behavior controls constitute external controls because
they reflect an outside firm’s (i.e., manufacturer’s) efforts at directing another firm’s (i.e.,
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distributor’s) employees. Surprisingly, despite their pervasiveness in practice, there is
little research on external controls (for an exception see Coughlan and Joseph 2012).
Moreover, there is scant research on whether external controls serve their intended
purpose—i.e., to focus distributor salesperson effort on a particular manufacturer’s
products. Consequently, research provides little guidance to manufacturers on whether
their investments in these controls pay off.
This research makes two key contributions to the literature. First, we advance the
concept of external controls, or mechanisms by which one firm directs another firm’s
employees, and elaborates on how they affect a distributor salesperson’s manufacturerfocused effort. The sparse research on external controls is in stark contrast with the
extensive literature on internal controls—that is, firms’ use of outcome and/or behavior
controls to direct their own employees (e.g., Anderson and Oliver 1987; Cravens et al.
1993). Unlike internal controls, which are legitimized by the employer–employee
contract, external controls are outside of such a contract (French and Raven 1959;
Johnson 1994; Tyler 2006). Thus, salespeople who receive external controls may
question their legitimacy. Therefore, we argue that the effect of external controls is
largely contingent upon salespeople being able to address these legitimacy concerns.
Our second contribution, therefore, stems from demonstrating nuanced and novel
cross-level interactive effects of external controls. External controls may give rise to a
tension between distributor salespeople’s desire to respond to them (e.g., to a
manufacturer’s financial incentives and/or training) and their concerns about the
appropriateness of doing so (Radin and Predmore 2002). To address this tension,
salespeople are likely to assess the legitimacy of being influenced by these external
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controls (e.g., Tost 2011). Specifically, salespeople are likely to look to legitimate
authority figures (i.e., sales managers) (Ahearne et al. 2013) for cues to guide their
behavior (Bandura 1977; Tost 2011). We propose that an important cue to salespeople is
whether their sales manager is also influenced by these external controls.
Similar to those of salespeople, a sales manager’s external controls can be of two
types: outcome or behavior. Consequently, this raises the question whether the type of
sales manager’s external control is pertinent in influencing a salesperson’s effort. We
argue that it is. We predict that the degree of effort salespeople expend on a
manufacturer’s products will depend on whether their external controls are similar or
dissimilar to those of their managers (Figure 2.2). Specifically, when distributor
salespeople and their sales managers are recipients of similar external controls (e.g., both
are recipients of external outcome [or behavior] control), salespeople should be motivated
to expend greater effort on selling a manufacturer’s products. However, when distributor
salespeople and their managers are recipients of dissimilar external controls, the effects
are nuanced. We predict that if a manager receives behavior control while a salesperson
receives outcome control, salespeople will be motivated to expend greater effort; the
reverse, however, reduces effort. To the best of our knowledge, prior studies on controls
have not considered the interactive effects of controls across levels of analysis (e.g.,
salesperson and sales manager). Thus, the present research addresses calls from scholars
to better understand the contingent effects of controls across multiple levels of the firm
(e.g., Krafft et al. 2012; Miao and Evans 2013).
We test our theoretical framework using a unique data set compiled from three
different sources (salespeople, sales managers, and manufacturer objective sales data)
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across two hierarchical levels (salespeople and sales managers) and across many
distributors. Such a design accounts for the nested nature of salesperson–sales manager
relationships, reduces concerns about common method bias, and affords the opportunity
to test cross-level interactions. The next section synthesizes the relevant literature on
internal and external controls and legitimacy. Then, we present the hypotheses. We
subsequently describe the sample, methodology, and results. Finally, we provide
implications for theory and practice, address limitations, and offer guidance for further
research.
2.2

Background
A control system is defined as “an organization’s set of procedures for

monitoring, directing, evaluating, and compensating its employees” (Anderson and
Oliver 1987, p. 76). The literature on controls can be organized along two dimensions:
source of the control (i.e., internal or external) and level at which these controls are used
(i.e., within-level or cross-level) (Table 2.2). Internal controls refer to controls that a firm
uses to govern its own employees, while external controls are controls that a firm uses to
govern another firm’s employees1. Internal and external controls may be targeted to
individuals within a single level (e.g., salespeople) or across levels (e.g., salespeople and
sales managers). To date, however, most research has focused on within-level analysis.
Furthermore, the few studies exploring external controls (for a summary, see Table 2.3)
have focused on one type of control and within-level analysis. As such, we address an

1

Previous research suggests that manufacturers may also rely on external firm-level controls such as
providing slotting allowances to distributors (Gilliland 2003). These firm-level external controls are
targeted at distributor firms to carry their products rather than individuals within the firm and are, thus, not
a focus of the study.
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important gap in the literature by focusing on external outcome and behavior controls
aimed at both salespeople and their managers (i.e., cross-level controls, bottom-righthand corner of Table 2.2).
Examining external controls is important because they provide manufacturers a
way to govern downstream salespeople who have a more direct and proximal influence
on customer purchasing decisions than they do (Badrinarayanan and Laverie 2011).
Importantly, they can be used to govern people at multiple levels within downstream
relationships (e.g., salespeople and sales managers), thereby providing manufacturers
with more opportunities for targeted influence within a downstream reselling firm. Thus,
although it is possible for a particular manufacturer to target an individual salesperson
with both behavior and outcome controls, the focus here is on the target of external
controls across levels of individuals (i.e., salespeople and sales managers). Similar to
internal controls, we suggest that external control systems consist of outcome and
behavior controls, and we distinguish them in the following subsections.
2.2.1

External Outcome Control
External outcome control refers to the extent to which a manufacturer monitors

and provides rewards and recognition for the sales of its products by another firm’s
employees (e.g., Challagalla and Shervani 1996). Manufacturers may provide financial
rewards and recognition for achieving a particular sales target or on a transactional basis
for individual sales of their products. The most common financial rewards are distributorapproved SPIFs, which refer to commissions a manufacturer pays directly to the
distributor’s sales force for sales of its products (Zoltners, Shinha, and Lorimer 2006).
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SPIFs are typically offered as debit cards, gift cards, or checks sent directly to
salespeople and/or their sales managers (Table 2.1 and Appendix A1.1). Prior research
suggests that contingent rewards (e.g., SPIFs) enhance extrinsic motivation of recipients
(e.g., Oliver and Anderson 1994) and, ultimately, focus greater effort on a particular
manufacturer (Coughlan and Joseph 2012). This effort, which we call manufacturerfocused effort, reflects the extent to which a salesperson pursues opportunities to sell a
particular manufacturer’s products.
2.2.2

External Behavior Control
External behavior control refers to the extent to which a manufacturer provides

direction to another firm’s employees on the process of selling its products (e.g.,
Challagalla and Shervani 1996). Firms may focus on the process of selling by providing
direction on the activities salespeople or their managers should engage in (e.g., number of
sales calls to make) and/or by improving their capabilities through training and coaching.
Distributors that carry products of competing manufacturers are highly unlikely to grant a
particular manufacturer permission to monitor and guide the daily activities of their
employees. Instead, distributors are more likely to allow manufacturers to provide
coaching and training for selling their specific products (Gilliland 2003). Thus, we focus
on external behavior control in terms of the coaching and training a manufacturer
provides to a distributor’s salespeople and sales managers.
Such training is often directed by manufacturer field representatives, who visit
distributors and train salespeople on their products and sales methods, attend sales calls,
and provide local resources as needed to aid in the selling process. It may also involve
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training distributor sales managers on how to coach and train their salespeople on the
manufacturer’s products. This training develops distributor salespeople’s and managers’
manufacturer-specific skills and abilities, which is likely to increase their confidence and
intrinsic motivation to sell the manufacturer’s products and, ultimately, their
manufacturer-focused effort (Anderson and Oliver 1987; Pettijohn, Pettijohn, and Taylor
2002; Román, Ruiz, and Munuera 2002).
2.2.3

External Controls: A Legitimacy Perspective
Prior research suggests that (internal) controls are likely to enhance effort (e.g.,

Miao and Evans 2013). Outcome control does so by stimulating extrinsic motivation,
while behavior control does so by enhancing intrinsic motivation (Cravens et al. 1993;
Oliver and Anderson 1994). However, there is an important distinction between internal
and external controls that is likely to qualify these relationships. Employees are likely to
view internal controls as stemming from an obligatory source. The reason is that
employees recognize employers’ or managers’ right to prescribe actions per the terms of
their employment (Ouchi 1980). Thus, employees are likely to feel obligated to comply
with internal controls. In contrast, external controls are attempts by one firm to influence
another firm’s employees. Such controls lie outside the employer–employee contract.
Thus, distributor salespeople are likely to perceive external controls as nonobligatory
influences by an external firm (Ouchi 1980).
In the absence of obligation, distributor salespeople have the freedom to choose
whether to accede to the influence of a manufacturer’s external controls. On the one
hand, distributor salespeople may view manufacturer outcome control (e.g., financial
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rewards) and behavior control (e.g., training) as beneficial for achieving their own goals.
On the other hand, nonobligatory influences often elicit concerns or questions about
legitimacy (e.g., Fisher 2007; Wazana 2000). Legitimacy refers to “a generalized
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions”
(Suchman 1995, p. 574). Thus, distributor salespeople may question whether their
decision-making has been compromised in favor of a particular manufacturer over the
interests of their customers (Fisher 2007). Salespeople may raise questions such as, “Are
these SPIFs clouding my judgment in doing the right thing for my customer?” or “Am I
letting this manufacturer’s training unduly influence me?” These questions give rise to a
tension between being influenced by external controls and the appropriateness of doing
so.
How do salespeople resolve this tension? Social learning theory suggests that
people often search for cues from role models to address such quandaries (Bandura
1977). In particular, employees look to authority figures such as managers for signals on
how to behave (e.g., Handfield and Baumer 2006) or to legitimize their actions (Tost
2011). Observing these cues leads people to adopt or avoid certain behaviors (Lam,
Kraus, and Ahearne 2010). Indeed, research on social learning theory reinforces these
arguments and finds that learning from referents (e.g., managers) influences the degree to
which employees learn and adopt behaviors (Bandura 1977; Fullagar et al. 1995;
Hartline, Maxham, and McKee 2000; Schillewaert et al. 2005). In particular, sales
managers being recipients of external controls provides legitimacy to the controls and
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alleviates salesperson tension (e.g., Tyler 2006).2 Thus, we anticipate that the relationship
between a manufacturer’s external controls to distributor salespeople and their
manufacturer-focused effort will be contingent on the external controls targeted to the
sales manager.
2.3

Contingency Hypotheses
We explore the impact of the interaction effects of external salesperson controls

and external sales manager controls on a salesperson’s manufacturer-focused effort, or
the extent to which a salesperson pursues opportunities to sell the products of a particular
manufacturer. It reflects the effort salespeople expend in proactively looking for
opportunities, seeking customers, and making calls specifically to sell a particular
manufacturer’s products. The emphasis on effort is consistent with recent research that
highlights that (internal) controls enhance selling effort (Miao and Evans 2013).
Moreover, effort is a key outcome variable in recent multi-brand (Badrinarayanan and
Laverie 2011) and multi-manufacturer sales research (Hughes and Ahearne 2010). That
being said, although manufacturer-focused effort (henceforth, focused effort) is
important, manufacturers are also interested in knowing whether this effort manifests in
greater sales of their products. Accordingly, we also examine the effect of focused effort
on manufacturer-focused performance (henceforth, focused performance), which refers

2

Sales managers are less likely to experience the same level of tension regarding external controls as their
salespeople for two key reasons. First, sales managers are more likely to have approved the use of external
controls (or have been a part of the approval process) within their firm. Second, they are an additional step
removed from customers, which reduces their concerns about ramifications associated with being unduly
influenced by external controls.
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to the volume of sales a distributor salesperson obtains for a particular manufacturer’s
products. As such, this is an objective measure of performance.
Figure 2.2 presents two dimensions through which we explore the contingency
effects in this study. The first dimension is the type of salesperson external control
(outcome or behavior), and the second is the type of sales manager external control
(outcome or behavior). Combined, these dimensions yield two interactions in which
salesperson and sales manager controls are similar (i.e., both salesperson and sales
manager receive outcome control or behavior control) and two interactions in which
salesperson and sales manager controls are dissimilar (i.e., salesperson receives outcome
control and sales manager receives behavior control, or vice versa).
2.3.1

Similar External Controls: Salesperson Outcome × Manager Outcome
Manufacturers that extend external outcome control tend to provide financial

rewards (i.e., SPIFs) for selling their products. Sales managers’ receipt of external
outcome control provides a salient norm and legitimacy to salespeople who may be
questioning the appropriateness of acting on their own extrinsic motivation stemming
from external outcome control (Lam, Kraus, and Ahearne 2010). Furthermore, sales
managers who are recipients of these financial incentives (i.e., external outcome control
is high) are likely to be extrinsically motivated to promote the manufacturer’s products
(Anderson and Oliver 1987; Bradford et al. 2010; Oliver and Anderson 1994). This
motivation is likely to manifest itself in explicit encouragement or additional tacit
approval of the manufacturer’s products to their salespeople. Such manager endorsement
should mitigate doubts about legitimacy, thus encouraging salespeople to respond to their
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own external outcome control by putting forth greater effort on selling the manufacturer’s
products.
Alternatively, when sales managers receive no financial incentives or recognition
from manufacturers (i.e., external outcome control is low), they are less likely to endorse
the manufacturer’s products (e.g., Palmatier et al. 2009). Thus, salespeople are less likely
to perceive cues from their manager in support of the manufacturer’s products.
Accordingly, salespeople’s legitimacy concerns about responding to a manufacturer’s
external behavior control are likely to persist. In this case, salespeople are less likely to
be influenced by a manufacturer’s external outcome control.
H1: An increase in sales manager external outcome control positively
affects the relationship between salesperson external outcome
control and focused effort.
2.3.2

Similar External Controls: Salesperson Behavior × Manager Behavior
Manufacturers that extend external behavior control attempt to intrinsically

motivate distributor salespeople by providing guidance on the process of selling their
products. This guidance is often in the form of coaching and training from local field
representatives (Gilliland 2003). Salespeople who observe their sales manager attending
training sessions or accepting coaching from a manufacturer receive a strong signal
regarding the legitimacy of being influenced by these external controls (e.g., Tost 2011).
These signals help alleviate salespeople’s concerns about whether such training is unduly
influencing them. Furthermore, managers who receive manufacturer coaching and
training become more knowledgeable and confident about its products (Miao, Evans, and
Zou 2007), which is likely to boost their intrinsic motivation to provide assistance to
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salespeople in selling the manufacturer’s products (Miao and Evans 2013). The receipt of
supervisory assistance adds to the legitimacy of a manufacturer’s external behavior
control (e.g., Tyler 2006). These cues should alleviate salespeople’s doubts about
embracing a manufacturer’s external behavior control and putting forth effort on selling
its products (e.g., Palmatier et al. 2009).
Alternatively, when sales managers receive little training or coaching from
manufacturers (i.e., external behavior control is low), salespeople’s doubts about
responding to their own external behavior control are likely to endure. Furthermore,
managers are less knowledgeable about the manufacturer’s products and therefore are
less likely to provide assistance to or be supportive of their products (e.g., Palmatier et al.
2009). Thus, salespeople are likely to have legitimacy concerns about a manufacturer’s
external behavior control and are less likely to expend effort in response to the external
outcome control.
H2: An increase in sales manager external behavior control positively
affects the relationship between salesperson external behavior
control and focused effort.
2.3.3

Dissimilar External Controls: Salesperson Outcome × Manager Behavior
We now consider the case of dissimilar controls in which the salesperson receives

external outcome control and the sales manager receives external behavior control. As we
argued previously, sales managers’ receipt of coaching and training from manufacturers
(i.e., higher levels of external behavior control) should legitimize the external controls in
the eyes of salespeople (Tyler 2006). Furthermore, sales managers who receive training
from manufacturers are more knowledgeable about their products (Challagalla and
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Shervani 1996) and thus are more likely to encourage and assist their salespeople in
selling a particular manufacturer’s products (Palmatier et al. 2009). Guidance from their
manager reinforces salespeople’s own extrinsic motivation (stemming from their external
outcome control) to promote the manufacturer’s products and lessens their concerns
about the appropriateness of acting on this motivation (Lam, Kraus, and Ahearne 2010).
However, at low levels of manager external behavior control, salespeople’s doubts
regarding being influenced by their own external outcome control persist.
H3:

2.3.4

An increase in sales manager external behavior control positively
affects the relationship between salesperson external outcome
control and focused effort.

Dissimilar External Controls: Salesperson Behavior × Manager Outcome
In contrast with H3, we expect that when the dissimilar types of controls are

reversed, such that the sales manager receives external outcome control and the
salesperson receives external behavior control, the focused effort of salespeople will
diminish. Why might this be the case? When sales managers’ external outcome control is
higher, they are likely to be extrinsically motivated to push their salespeople to sell the
manufacturer’s products. Alternatively, salespeople who are governed by external
behavior control are likely to be intrinsically motivated (Challagalla and Shervani 1996;
Oliver and Anderson 1994). The motivation literature suggests that extrinsic motivational
influences undermine people’s intrinsic motivation (e.g., Deci, Koestner, and Ryan
1999). Thus, salespeople who are intrinsically motivated by a manufacturer’s coaching
and training are likely to resent pressure from their sales managers to sell the
manufacturer’s products primarily for their own (i.e., manager’s) financial gain
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(Offerman 2002; Samaha, Palmatier, and Dant 2011). Indeed, such financial gains
resulting from another individual’s efforts are often construed as unfair (e.g., Tyler 1997,
2006). These feelings of unfairness are likely to negatively affect salespeople’s focused
effort on a manufacturer’s products, even when they believe such influence is legitimate.
Alternatively, when sales managers’ external outcome control is lower, they will
have less incentive to promote the products of a particular manufacturer. Thus, managers
will provide few cues regarding their support of a manufacturer’s products. In this case,
although salespeople will remain uncertain about the legitimacy of their own external
behavior controls, they will not feel undermined as in the case of greater manager
external outcome control.
H4:

2.3.5

An increase in sales manager external outcome control negatively
affects the relationship between salesperson external behavior
control and focused effort.

Focused Effort and Focused Performance
Focused performance refers to the volume of sales a distributor salesperson

obtains for a particular manufacturer’s products. We suggest a positive relationship
between manufacturer-focused effort and focused performance for several reasons.
Salespeople with greater focused effort proactively seek out prospects and are more
aware of opportunities to sell a particular manufacturer’s products. Such proactive effort
and awareness are likely to manifest in more sales opportunities, which should increase
the salesperson’s performance with the manufacturer’s products (Fu, Richards, and Jones
2009). Correspondingly, prior research suggests that (brand) effort is positively related to
(brand) performance (Hughes and Ahearne 2010).
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H5:

Focused effort is positively related to focused performance.

2.4

Method

2.4.1

Sample
This study includes data from downstream distributor salespeople and their sales

managers recruited from a large international imaging products and solutions
manufacturer with more than $4 billion in annual revenues (see Appendix A1.2 for IRB
approval). The participating firm sells its higher-end products through a network of
independently owned business-to-business multiline distributors and its lower-end
products through big-box retailers. In this study, we focus on business-to-business sales
of multifunction printers, a prominent product category for the manufacturer, through its
distributor network. This setting is particularly suitable for the study because of the
industry’s and manufacturer’s reliance on external controls. For example, the
participating firm employs field-based representatives to train and coach distributor
salespeople and managers about its multifunction printers and how to sell them. In
addition, the firm offers distributor salespeople and sales managers SPIFs (i.e., financial
rewards) and recognition for selling its printers.
We collected the cross-level data in three stages. First, the participating
manufacturer provided us with the list of its 2,111 downstream distributor salespeople.
We e-mailed them a description of the study, an endorsement letter from the
manufacturer’s vice president of sales, and a link to the online survey. We made it clear
that respondents’ answers would be submitted directly to the authors of the study. All
distributor salespeople who completed the survey received a $10 gift card to a national
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retailer of their choice. Second, on completion of the salesperson surveys, we linked
individual distributor salespeople to their sales managers through the manufacturer’s
database. We then e-mailed sales managers a description of the study and a link to an
online survey. Each sales manager’s survey was tailored to include a portion that assessed
the focused effort of each of their salespeople who had previously completed a survey.
Sales managers also received a gift card for completed surveys. Of the 2,111 distributor
salespeople contacted, we received 434 responses (a 20.5% response rate). These 434
distributor salespeople reported to 211 unique sales managers. Of these unique sales
managers, 102 responded (a 48.3% response rate). Managers reported on an average of
1.97 salespeople; therefore, our results reflect 201 unique salesperson–manager dyads.
Third, we linked each dyad of survey responses to each salesperson’s objective sales
volume for the product category of interest from the participating manufacturer’s sales
database.
The first and last survey completion date quartiles showed no significant
differences on the study variables across both salesperson and sales manager data,
suggesting that nonresponse bias is of minimal concern (Armstrong and Overton 1977).
The average sales experience for salespeople and sales managers was 15.11 and 16.03
years, respectively. Men constituted 75% of salesperson and 87% of manager
respondents, which is typical for this particular industry.
2.4.2

Construct Measures
We conducted eight hour-long round table meetings with selected managers,

program coordinators, and field representatives of the participating firm to ensure the
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appropriateness of our measures and approach. We adapted multi-item scales to the
manufacturer context. Unless otherwise noted, all items were anchored by “strongly
disagree” (1) and “strongly agree” (5). Appendix A1.3 reports the items, factor loadings,
and Cronbach’s alphas for each scale.
2.4.2.1 External Outcome and Behavior Controls of Salespeople and Sales Managers
Prior research on external outcome control suggests that manufacturers typically
provide SPIFs and recognition to distributor salespeople for selling their products (e.g.,
Caldieraro and Coughlan 2007; Coughlan and Joseph 2012). These rewards parallel those
that Challagalla and Shervani (1996) identify as (internal) output rewards, and thus we
adapted the four items from their scale for our context. For example, the original scale
asks salespeople about whether they are rewarded for achieving “market share targets.”
In our context, manufacturers typically do not set market share targets for individual
distributor salespeople; thus, we changed this item to obtaining “compensation for selling
the manufacturer’s products.” We dropped one item from the Challagalla and Shervani
scale because it was irrelevant to the study context. This item pertained to promotion
opportunities, which outside manufacturers cannot provide to distributor salespeople. The
external outcome control scale for the sales managers is similar to that of salespeople.
The main difference is that sales managers are typically rewarded by the manufacturer for
their salespeople’s sales, as managers do not generally generate their own sales.
Manufacturer behavior control includes providing coaching and training on
products. This notion of coaching and training parallels Challagalla and Shervani’s
(1996) concept of capability information controls. Accordingly, we adapted their five

31

items to our context. Unlike the original scale, the adapted items are manufacturer
specific (e.g., providing advice during joint sales calls). We excluded the item “My
manager has standards by which my selling skills are evaluated” because manufacturers
are likely not able or allowed to impose selling standards on another firm’s sales force. In
its place, we added two items that more explicitly capture training and coaching, which
are important aspects of external behavior control. We collected external controls at two
levels by having salespeople and their managers report on their own external controls
from the focal manufacturer.
2.4.2.2 Focused Effort
We assessed focused effort using a scale that captures the salesperson’s proactive
behavior in searching for, seeking out, and making calls specifically for one
manufacturer’s products over other manufacturers’ products. This scale is adapted from
established salesperson effort scales (e.g., Rapp et al. 2010; Badrinarayanan and Laverie
2011; Bonney and Williams 2009; Brown and Peterson 1994; Hughes and Ahearne
2010). In line with Hughes and Ahearne (2010), we had sales managers assess
salesperson effort. Having effort evaluated by sales managers rather than salespeople
alleviates concerns with both social desirability and common method biases.
2.4.2.3 Focused Performance
We obtained objective sales volume data for each salesperson for the focal
product category from the participating manufacturer’s sales database. Consistent with
prior research, we use sales volume during the one-month period in which the survey was
administered (e.g., Hughes and Ahearne 2010).
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2.4.2.4 Covariates

In this research, we focus on the interplay of external controls across levels of
analysis rather than within levels. However, given recent research that examines withinlevel control system interactions (e.g., Miao and Evans 2012, 2013; Wang, Dou, and
Zhou 2012), we also account for the interaction between salesperson external outcome
and behavior controls. In addition, we draw from previous research to include covariates
that are likely to influence a salesperson’s focused effort on a particular manufacturer’s
products. These include the salesperson’s perception of the manufacturer’s reputation
(Badrinarayanan and Laverie 2011) and the number of manufacturer products a
salesperson is able to sell (Anderson and Weitz 1992; Frazier 1999; Hughes and Ahearne
2010). We also control for salespeople’s sales experience (Franke and Park 2006; Fu,
Richards, and Jones 2009), as well as their internal outcome and behavior controls
(Challagalla and Shervani 1996). By including internal controls, we establish the impact
of external controls beyond the traditional controls influencing salespeople.
2.4.3

Measurement Model
We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis to assess the validity of our

measures (Gerbing and Anderson 1988). Although the chi-square statistic is significant,
(χ2 = 1086.17, p < .001, d.f. = 647), the model exhibits excellent fit (comparative fit index
= .94; root mean square error of approximation = .06; standardized root mean square
residual = .05) (Hu and Bentler 1999). Significant item loadings indicate convergent
validity (i.e., t-values > 2). Coefficient alphas, composite reliabilities (CR), and average
variance extracted (AVE) exceed recommendations (i.e., coefficient alpha > .70, CR >
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.70, and AVE > .50), demonstrating both convergent and discriminant validity (Fornell
and Larcker 1981) (Table 2.4).
2.4.4

Model Specification
We calculated the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) of focused effort, the

outcome of the four hypothesized cross-level interactions. The ICC represents the
percentage of total variance explained by the nested nature of salespeople within
managers and resulted in an ICC of .53. As Figure 2.1 shows, the relationship between
focused effort and focused performance is within Level 1 and therefore could be
specified as a simple linear regression model. However, focused effort is a function of
Level 1 variables (salesperson external outcome and behavior controls) and their
interactions with Level 2 variables (manager external outcome and behavior controls).
Multilevel modeling is a statistical approach that allows us to estimate the model with
variables at both the individual and group level simultaneously, recognizing that
salespeople working for the same manager may act similarly to each other and differently
from other manager groups (i.e., partial interdependence) (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).
Predicting focused effort involves a two-step approach in which focused effort is
regressed on Level 1 indicators:
FEij = 0j + 1j(SEO)ij + 2j(SEB)ij + rij.

(1)

Next, those intercept and slopes are regressed on the Level 2 variables:




0j = 00 + 01(MEO)j + 02(MEB)j + 0j,





1j = 10 + 11(MEO)j + 12(MEB)j + 1j, and
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2.4.4



2j = 20 + 21(MEO)j + 22(MEB)j + 1j.

Addressing Endogeneity
It is possible that the key exogenous variables in our model (i.e., salesperson

external controls) are subject to issues of endogeneity. Specifically, a salesperson’s drive
to respond to a survey endorsed by a particular manufacturer may have been influenced
by the strength of the relationship quality with that manufacturer’s field representative
involved in administering both outcome and behavior controls (e.g., Badrinarayanan and
Laverie 2013). If so, this would result in self-selection of only particular types of
salespeople into the study (i.e., those with high levels of relationship quality). If not
addressed, this self-selection bias may cause an overestimation of the relationship
between salesperson external controls and focused effort on the particular manufacturer
(Bascle 2008). In line with Chakravarty, Kumar, and Grewal (2014) and Grewal,
Chakravarty, and Saini (2010), to correct for this bias, we follow the steps Garen (1984)
outlines and regress each of the salesperson external control measures on the potential
driver (i.e., relationship quality). We regress salesperson external outcome control on the
salesperson’s perception of his or her relationship quality with the manufacturer’s field
representative, a three-item scale adapted from Anderson and Weitz (1992) and Palmatier
(2008). This process yields the following predicted error equation:
(5A)

Z1 = β3x1 + υ1,

where Z1 is salesperson external outcome control, x1 is relationship quality with
the field representative, β3 is the correction coefficient for relationship quality with field
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representative, and υ1 is the standard error. Salesperson external behavior control follows
a similar pattern. This process yields the following predicted error equation:
(5B)

Z2 = β4x2 + υ2,

where Z2 is salesperson external behavior control, x2 is relationship quality with the
manufacturer’s field representative, β4 is the correction coefficient for relationship quality
with the manufacturer’s field representative, and υ2 is the standard error. We then
multiply the estimated error coefficients from Equations 5A and 5B by their respective
salesperson external control variable, as each error coefficient may fluctuate for each
continuous value of the external control. Thus, combining Equations 1–4, as well as the
control variables and endogeneity bias correction coefficients, yields:
FEij = 00 + 01(MEO)j + 02(MEB)j + 10(SEO)ij + 11MEOj(SEO)ij + 12MEBj(SEO)ij +
20(SEB)j + 21 MEOj(SEB)ij + 22MEBj(SEB)ij + 0j + 1j(SEO)ij + 1j(SEB)ij +
β5j(SEO*SEB)ij + β6j(REP)ij + β7j(NUM)ij + β8j(EXP)ij + β9j(SIO)ij + β10j(SIB)ij+ αυ1ij𝜐̂1ij +
αυZ1ij𝜐̂Z1ij + α𝜐2ij𝜐̂2ij + αυ2ij𝜐̂Z2ij + rij,
where
FEij = focused effort of salesperson i,
SEOij = external outcome control of salesperson i,
SEBij = external behavior control of salesperson i,
MEOij = external outcome control of manager j,
MEBij = external behavior control of manager j,
REPij= reputation of manufacturer for salesperson i,
NUMij = number of manufacturers available for salesperson i,
EXPij = sales experience in years of salesperson i,
SIOij = internal outcome control of salesperson i,
SIBij= internal behavior control of salesperson i,
α𝜐̂1ij = correction coefficient for external outcome control of salesperson i,
𝜐̂Z1ij = correction coefficient × external outcome control of salesperson i,
α𝜐̂2ij = correction coefficient for external behavior control of salesperson i, and
𝜐̂Z2ij = correction coefficient × external behavior control of salesperson i.
We take a similar approach for predicting the outcome of focused effort on focused
performance, controlling for all cross-level interactions and covariates.
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2.4.5

Hypothesis Testing
To estimate the model, we use Mplus version 7 (Muthén and Muthén 2012)

because of its ability to analyze complex hierarchical models using full maximum
likelihood estimation. We first fit a baseline model with only the effects of salesperson
external controls on focused performance through focused effort (Table 2.5, Model 1).
We then create interaction terms by multiplying mean-centered salesperson external
controls by mean-centered manager external controls (Aiken and West 1991). Then, we
estimate the full hypothesized model, including the cross-level moderators (Table 2.5,
Model 2). Standard fit indexes are not available for comparing nested models with
Mplus; therefore, as is common practice, we compare the fit of these models using a loglikelihood difference test (e.g., Hughes and Ahearne 2010; Wieseke et al. 2012). The
hypothesized model including cross-level moderators fits better than the nonmoderated
model (Δχ2 = 26.48, Δd.f. [number of free parameters] = 16, p ≤ .05), indicating that the
inclusion of the Level 2 variables (i.e., manager external controls) into the model predicts
the outcome variables better than a model with only within-level variables (i.e.,
salesperson external controls).
The results of the full hypothesized model indicate that manager external outcome
control positively interacts with salesperson external outcome control to influence
focused effort (β = .07, p ≤ .05), providing support for H1. H2 is also supported; manager
external behavior control positively interacts with salesperson external behavior control
to influence focused effort (β = .03, p ≤ .01). Manager external behavior control has little
impact on the relationship between salesperson external outcome control and focused
effort (β = –.01, n.s.); thus, H3 is not supported. However, in support of H4, the results
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indicate that manager external outcome control negatively interacts with salesperson
external behavior control to influence focused effort (β = –.04, p ≤ .05). Finally, focused
effort is positively related to focused performance, in support of H5 (β = .32, p ≤ .05).
The results of the control variables are mixed. The interaction between
salesperson external outcome and salesperson external behavior controls is not significant
(β = –.01, n.s.). In addition, manufacturer reputation (β = .13, n.s.), salesperson
experience (β = –.03, n.s.), and salesperson internal outcome control (β = .02, n.s.) have
no significant impact on focused effort. However, the number of manufacturers the
salesperson is able to sell for (β = –.02, p ≤ .01) and salesperson internal behavior control
(β = –.11, p ≤ .01) are negatively related to focused effort.
2.4.6

Cross-Level Interactions
A major goal of this research is to understand the impact of manager external

controls on the relationship between salesperson external controls and focused effort.
Therefore, to better understand the significant cross-level interactions, we employ the
two-level hierarchical linear modeling simple slope generator provided by Preacher,
Curran, and Bauer (2006). We plot these interactions at +/– 1 standard deviation from the
mean for manager external controls. Figures 2.3–2.5 display each of the significant
interactions.
The interaction plot in Figure 2.3 (H1) shows that the relationship between
salesperson external outcome control and focused effort is positive when sales manager
outcome control is high, but negative when sales manager outcome control is low. This
latter finding lends support to the argument that salespeople question nonobligatory
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influences. In this particular case, salespeople might question, for example, whether a
manufacturer is providing higher levels of incentives because of some underlying issue or
problem with the product (e.g., pending product discontinuation, poor quality, inventory
glut). As expected, Figure 2.4 (H2) shows that increasing sales manager external behavior
control positively impacts the relationship between salesperson external behavior control
and focused effort. Figure 2.5 shows the interaction hypothesized in H4—increasing sales
manager external outcome control negatively impacts the relationship between
salesperson external behavior control and focused effort. The relationship becomes less
positive (and, indeed, turns slightly negative) as sales manager external outcome control
increases. From a theoretical standpoint, this finding provides support for our contention
that extrinsic rewards to one party (i.e., sales manager) may undermine the intrinsic
motivation of another party (i.e., salesperson).
2.5

Discussion
Despite the prevalence of external controls in practice, prior research has mostly

focused on internal controls. Accordingly, we complement and extend the existing
controls literature by advancing the concept of external controls. In doing so, we
highlight two primary forms—external outcome and external behavior control—that
upstream firms (e.g., manufacturers) can employ at multiple levels in downstream firms
(e.g., distributors). We draw on the legitimacy and social learning literatures to suggest
that the impact of salespeople’s external controls on their manufacturer-focused effort is
nuanced and largely contingent on the type of sales manager external control.
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2.5.1

Theoretical Implications
In doing this research, we make three main theoretical contributions. First, we

contribute to theory and empirical research in the area of within-level control systems.
Marketing scholars have made significant contributions to the within-level internal
control systems literature (e.g., Anderson and Oliver 1987; Jaworski 1988) (Table 2.2).
However, a complementary stream of research on within-level external control systems is
missing. Although recent research has modeled the optimal level of external outcome
control (e.g., SPIFs) on individual products within a manufacturer’s product line
(Caldieraro and Coughlan 2007) and has acknowledged the existence of external
behavior control (e.g., training of distributor salespeople) as a tool for manufacturer field
representatives (Badrinarayanan and Laverie 2013), such studies address these issues
separately. Thus, we begin to coalesce theory on how one firm may govern another
firm’s employees by positioning these issues within the overall control systems literature.
Doing so allows for an integrative understanding of both internal and external controls,
and begins to lay a foundation for additional integrative research on within-level controls.
Second, although internal and external controls share some similarities, they differ
in an important way. Internal controls stem from employers, which obligates salespeople
to accede to their influence (e.g., Ouchi 1980). In contrast, external controls are
nonobligatory influences from an outside source. Thus, the freedom to accede to the
influence of external controls can give way to salespeople’s concerns about their
appropriateness and legitimacy. An important implication of our research, therefore, is
that firms should not expect internal and external controls to have identical influences.
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Third, we provide evidence that the impact of controls at lower levels of analysis
(e.g., salespeople) largely depends on the type of control at higher levels of analysis (e.g.,
sales managers). This is because salespeople look to their manager for cues to alleviate
the tension they experience from external controls. Correspondingly, we find that similar
manager external controls have a reinforcing effect on the salesperson’s external controls
such that focused effort is enhanced. Notably, however, increasing sales manager external
outcome control undermines the relationship between salesperson external behavior
control and focused effort. This suggests that external rewards to another person (e.g.,
sales manager) can undermine one’s own (e.g., salesperson) intrinsic motivation. Thus,
we provide a potential “cross-level” extension to cognitive evaluation theory, which
suggests parallel effects at the within-level of analysis (Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999).
Taken together, these findings begin to address calls from the literature to better
understand how control systems interplay at different levels of analysis (e.g., Coughlan
and Joseph 2012; Krafft et al. 2012; Miao and Evans 2013).
2.5.2

Managerial Implications
This research suggests that an outside firm (i.e., manufacturer) is capable of

influencing the behaviors of another firm’s (i.e., distributor’s) employees at multiple
levels of analysis. A key implication of our research is that the impact of salespeople’s
external controls on their manufacturer-focused effort (the intended effect of investing in
external controls), is largely contingent on the (dis)similarity of sales manager external
controls. Thus, manufacturers should be cognizant of the interplay of external outcomes
(e.g., financial incentives, recognition) and behavior controls (e.g., training) across
distributor salespeople and their managers.
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In particular, our results suggest that external outcome control directed at
salespeople has little impact on their focused effort in and of itself; however, external
outcome control directed at sales managers has a positive impact on their salespeople’s
focused effort. Thus, it may behoove manufacturers to allocate financial incentives and
recognition efforts to downstream sales managers rather than to salespeople. Doing so
appears to have spillover effects on salespeople’s focused effort. If, however,
manufacturers choose to provide external outcome control to downstream salespeople,
they also need to provide substantial outcome control to sales managers. As our results
suggest, not doing so can make the relationship between external outcome control
directed at salespeople and their focused effort negative (i.e., the greater the SPIFs to
salespeople, the lesser is their focused effort). Without external outcome control to their
managers, salespeople have few cues to offset their concerns about the appropriateness of
acting on these external influences. Moreover, salespeople may question the motives
behind greater outcome control. Providing external outcome control to sales managers
appears to alleviate these concerns. Indeed, our results suggest that when sales managers
are provided with greater external outcome control, there is a positive relationship
between external outcome control directed at salespeople and their focused effort.
Somewhat surprisingly, our results also suggest that external behavior control
directed at salespeople and their sales managers has little impact on focused effort alone.
However, there is a positive relationship between salespeople’s external behavior control
and their manufacturer-focused effort when their sales manager’s external behavior
control is higher. This implies that training programs should be targeted to both
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salespeople and sales managers, with an emphasis on sales managers learning how to
coach their salespeople on selling the particular manufacturer’s products.
In addition, the relationship between salesperson external behavior control and
focused effort becomes less positive as sales manager external outcome control increases.
Thus, manufacturers should be cognizant that extrinsic rewards provided to managers
(e.g., SPIFs) may undermine salespeople’s intrinsic motivation normally associated with
manufacturer training and coaching.
2.6

Limitations and Further Research Directions
This study has its strengths, but also has several limitations. Although we assessed

salespeople’s focused effort from their managers, thereby minimizing social desirability
and common method biases (e.g., Podsakoff and Organ 1986), this measure is perceptual
nonetheless. Thus, further research should attempt to capture focused effort more
objectively (e.g., number of manufacturer-specific sales calls). This study also focused on
a single manufacturer within one business-to-business industry. Doing so allowed for a
tight conceptualization and analysis of the impact of external controls but also reduces
the generalizability of our results. Thus, further research might examine external controls
across manufacturers and/or industries. Furthermore, the salespeople in this study were
business-to-business account managers working for various office equipment distributors.
External controls are certainly not exclusive to this context. As Table 2.1 suggests,
external controls are prevalent in business-to-consumer settings as well (e.g., power tools
and equipment, appliances, electronics). Thus, research should consider similarities and
differences between business-to-business and business-to-consumer settings.

43

This research also assumes that salespeople are aware of their managers’ external
outcome and behavior controls. This is likely to be the case for three reasons. First, prior
research suggests that control systems elicit several signals and cues that others are likely
able to discern (Cravens et al. 1993; Oliver and Anderson 1994). For example,
salespeople can likely discern whether their manager is motivated by money or
recognition (e.g., when observing a more aggressive selling style, with little consideration
of customer needs). Second, salespeople are often aware of their manager’s external
outcome control (e.g., SPIFs) because the forms to participate in a manufacturer’s reward
program frequently ask whether a participant is a salesperson or sales manager. Third,
manufacturer training and recognition is often conducted collectively with both
salespeople and sales managers. Further research should, however, explore how explicit
awareness of controls impacts the relationships presented here.
This research sets the stage for several fruitful research avenues in the area of
external controls. The focus of this research was on the implications of external controls
for manufacturers. However, external controls are likely to have important implications
for distributors as well. For example, when should distributors allow manufacturers to
provide external controls to their salespeople and sales managers? On the one hand, a
distributor may be hesitant to allow external controls because it does not want to
relinquish control of salesperson behavior (see Appendix A1.4 for a popular press article
regarding this loss of control). Moreover, distributors may fear that sales force partiality
toward one manufacturer might result in subpar customer solutions, lost profit, and
alienation of their other upstream manufacturer partners. On the other hand, distributors
can benefit from manufacturers’ use of external controls because they provide
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supplemental income and training to their employees, which may boost satisfaction and
reduce turnover. Indeed, many hiring firms highlight the earning potential of SPIFs in job
descriptions (Appendix A1.5). Thus, further research could address the trade-offs
distributors face when considering whether or not to allow external controls.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, customers are largely unaware of the use of
external controls in both business-to-business and business-to-consumer contexts. While
customers have a general sense that salespeople may have ulterior motives behind their
recommendations, the source of the controls and the extent to which they are pursued by
salespeople are typically unknown. Customers could uncover potential biases from their
salespeople by inquiring into the amount of a salesperson’s SPIF, with the hope of
preventing salespeople from making improper product recommendations. Thus, further
research could explore how customer awareness of external controls affects their
receptivity to a particular product recommendation.
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2.7

Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Manufacturers’ Use of Outcome Control
(i.e., financial reward or SPIFs)

Company

Product

Incentive

2/90 Sign Systems
3M
AllSeating
Amana
Bio Ionic
Boost Mobile
Delsey Luggage
Embassy House
EWS
GMC
GMI
Grasshopper
Great Openings
GWD & Trane
Harter
Homer Laughlin Co.
Husqvarna
Indiana Furniture
John Deere
JVC
Kawai
Kawasaki
La-Z-Boy
LG
PIDA
Pioneer
Silestone Sen
Sony
Southern Ice
Swan
Telus
Watermark
Wilson Jones: Madeli
Workrite
Zoom Seating

Signage
Cleaning products
Contract furniture
HVAC
Salon products
Mobile phones
Luggage
Cabinetry
Water systems
Automotive accessories
Electronics
Farm equipment
Contract furniture
Heating & cooling
Contract furniture
China
Outdoor power equipment
Contract furniture
Outdoor power equipment
Electronics
Pianos
Engines & power products
Contract furniture
Electronics
Pet products
Electronics
Kitchen countertops
Electronics
Ice machines
Granite
Internet
Faucets & trim
Home vanities/countertops
Contract furniture
Contract furniture

$1 per unit (select models)
$50–$300 based on level of sales
$1–$20 per unit
$25–$75 per unit
$25 per 2 units sold
$55 per unit
$2–$8 per unit
$10 per cabinet
$75 per unit
$25
5% of net sale
$60–$200 per unit
$5–$10 per unit (select models)
$25–$175 per unit (select units)
3% of net sales
$2–$10 per dozen dishes
$10–$15 per unit (select models)
3% net sales
$5–$90 per unit
$50–$300 per unit
$25–$500 per piano
$10 per unit (select models)
$10 per unit
$10 per unit (select models)
$10 per unit & gift cards
$150–$500
$25–$75 per unit
$50–$650 per unit
$40 per unit
$10 per unit
Program points & $5–$10 per unit
$10 per unit (select models)
$5–$20 per unit
Up to 7% net (select models)
$2.50–$20 per unit
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Table 2.2: Controls Research Organized by Source and Level*

Source

Within-Level
(e.g.,
salesperson)

47
Level

Cross-Level
(e.g.,
salesperson and
sales manager)

Internal Controls

External Controls

Governance of individuals within a
hierarchical level within the firm through
the use of outcome and behavior controls

Governance of individuals within a
hierarchical level in another firm through
the use of outcome and behavior controls

Anderson and Oliver (1987); Agarwal (1996);
Basu et al. (1985); Celly and Frazier (1996);
Challagalla and Shervani (1996); Cravens et al.
(1993); Eisenhardt (1985; 1988); Jaworski
(1988); Jaworski and MacInnis (1989); Joseph
and Thevaranjan (1998); Kirsch (1997); Krafft
et al. (2012); Miao, Evans, and Zou (2006);
Oliver and Anderson (1994); Ouchi and
Maguire (1975); Ramaswami (1996)
Governance of individuals across
hierarchical levels within the firm through
the use of outcome and behavior controls

Research gap

Caldieraro and Coughlan (2007); Coughlan
and Joseph (2012); Gilliland (2004)

(see Table 3 for a summary of these studies)

Governance of individuals across
hierarchical levels in another firm through
the use of outcome and behavior controls

Research gap

-Focus of this paper-

Table 2.3: Summary of the Extant External Controls Literature

Authors

Conceptual

Caldieraro and
Coughlan (2007)

Level of
Analysis

Focus of
Study

Type of
Analysis
Empirical

●

Outcome
Control

Behavior
Control

WithinLevel
●

●

●
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●

CrossLevel

Coughlan and
Joseph (2012)

●

Gilliland (2004)

●

Current study

●

●

●

●

●

●

Brief Description
Models the optimal product to SPIF within a
manufacturer’s product line, given either monopolistic
or competitive environments.
Identifies SPIFs as a method used by manufacturers to
motivate downstream multi-manufacturer distributor
salespeople to expend more effort on their particular
products.
Identifies market development support from
manufacturers, including joint sales calls and product
demonstrations, as methods to motivate downstream
partners.
Empirically examines both external outcome and
external behavior controls across levels of analysis to
suggest that the impact of salespeople’s external
controls on their manufacturer-focused effort is largely
contingent on their sales manager’s external controls.

Table 2.4: Construct Reliabilities and Correlations
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1. External outcome control (S)
2. External behavior control (S)
3. External outcome control (M)
4. External behavior control (M)
5. Focused effort
6. Focused performance
7. Manufacturer reputation
8. Number of manufacturers
9. Salesperson experience
10. Internal outcome control (S)
11. Internal behavior control (S)
M
SD
α
ρ
AVE

1
1.00
.52**
.12
.09
-.06
.00
.27**
.08
-.09
.12
.08
3.65
.75
.79
.83
.62

2
1.00
.14*
.27**
.08
-.01
.28**
.02
-.09
.21**
.13
3.26
.93
.93
.94
.75

3

1.00
.45**
.30**
.00
.14*
-.06
.09
.03
-.03
3.20
.82
.80
.84
.63

4

5

1.00
.15*
.03
-.04
-.05
-.02
-.04
-.09
3.33
.87
.94
.95
.78

1.00
.13
.15*
-.06
.04
.01
-.08
3.55
.79
.89
.90
.75

6

1.00
-.01
-.02
.04
-.03
.00
.75
2.34
--a
--a
--a

p < .01, *p < .05.

**

Notes: S = salesperson; M = sales manager; = Cronbach’s alpha index of internal
consistency, = composite reliability index, AVE = average variance extracted,
a
= single-item measure.

7

1.00
.01
.13
.28**
.23**
3.98
.64
.89
.92
.78

8

9

1.00
1.00
-.12
**
-.05
-.18
-.12
-.02
15.11
4.31
10.45
7.32
a
--a
-a
--a
-a
--a
--

10

11

1.00
.40**
3.68
.85
.77
.79
.56

1.00
3.80
.78
.93
.94
.76

Table 2.5: Model Results
H0
Sign

Path from

Path to

Salesperson external outcome control (SEO)
Salesperson external behavior control (SEB)

Focused
Effort

-.54
.25

Moderators
Manager external outcome control (MEO)
Manager external behavior control (MEB)

Focused
Effort

-

.29***
-.01

-

.07*
.03**
-.01
-.04*

-.01
.17*
-.03**
-.03*
.02
-.12***

-.01
.13
-.02**
-.03
.02
-.11**

Interactions
SEO × MEO
SEB × MEB
SEO × MEB
SEB × MEO
Covariates
SEO × SEB
Manufacturer reputation
Number of manufacturers
Salesperson experience
Salesperson internal outcome control
Salesperson internal behavior control

Focused
Effort

H0

H1
H2
H3
H4

+
+
+
-

Focused
Effort

Addressing Endogeneity
𝜐̂1
(𝜐̂ × Z)1
𝜐̂2
(𝜐̂ × Z)2
Focused Effort

.31
.01
-.21
-.00
Focused
Performance

Log-likelihood
Free parameters (d.f.)
–2LL change
***

Model 1

H5

+

.32**
-881.46
29

p ≤ .001, **p ≤ .01, *p ≤ .05, n = 201.
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Model 2
.03
.09

-0.30
-0.16
-0.07*
-0.00
.32**
-868.22
45
26.48*

Figure 2.1: Conceptual Model
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Figure 2.2: Contingency Effects

Outcome Control
Behavior Control

Salesperson External Controls

Sales Manager External Control
Outcome Control
Behavior Control
Similar Controls

Dissimilar Controls

(Salesperson Outcome Control

(Salesperson Outcome Control

×

×

Sales Manager Outcome Control)

Sales Manager Behavior Control)

Dissimilar Controls

Similar Controls

(Salesperson Behavior Control

(Salesperson Behavior Control

×

×

Sales Manager Outcome Control)

Sales Manager Behavior Control)
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Figure 2.3: Interaction Plot for H1
Salesperson External Outcome Control ×
Manager External Outcome Control

2

Focused Effort

1.5

1
Manager Outcome
Control Low

0.5

Manager Outcome
Control High

0

-0.5

-1
Salesperson Outcome
Control Low

Salesperson Outcome
Control High
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Figure 2.4: Interaction Plot for H2
Salesperson External Behavior Control ×
Manager External Behavior Control
2

Focused Effort

1.5

1
Manager Behavior
Control Low

0.5

Manager Behavior
Control High

0

-0.5

-1
Salesperson Behavior
Control Low

Salesperson Behavior
Control High
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Figure 2.5: Interaction Plot for H4

Salesperson External Behavior Control ×
Manager External Outcome Control
2

Focused Effort

1.5

1
Manager Outcome
Control Low

0.5

Manager Outcome
Control High

0

-0.5

-1
Salesperson Behavior
Control Low

Salesperson Behavior
Control High

55

3

An Inductively-Generated Recommendation Process Model of Salespeople

3.1

Introduction

Imagine that Lucy, a thirty-something working professional, mother, and wife, walks into
a home improvement retailer. She heads to the appliance department to inquire about a
new range. After a brief exchange, the salesperson makes a recommendation, and she
thanks him for his time. An hour later, Lucy walks into a different location of the same
home improvement retailer. Again, she heads to the appliance department to inquire
about a new range. After a brief exchange, the salesperson makes a different
recommendation, and she thanks her for her time.
When we repeated such a scenario 71 times across three large home improvement
retailers, we received 31 different product recommendations. Moreover, we encountered
very different salesperson recommendation processes even within the same retailer. What
these findings suggest is that a customer, whose needs stay the same, may very well be
recommended different products depending upon which salesperson they happen to talk
to. Why do different salespeople recommend different products to customers with the
same needs? Why do salespeople differ in their sales recommendation processes despite
(presumably) similar training? These questions remain largely unanswered to date, which
is surprising given the important implications which can arise from providing such
conflicting advice to customers. The purpose of this research, therefore, is to begin to
address these questions and, in doing so, shed light on a salesperson’s underlying
recommendation process that customers can take into consideration when making a
purchasing decision.
Customers frequently rely on the advice or recommendations of salespeople for
several reasons. For example, salespeople are often privy to information that is not
readily available to customers (e.g., product return statistics). Additionally, customers
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may lack the time or knowledge to make the decision for themselves (Stone and Allgaier
2008). When customers rely on salespeople for advice and recommendations, they shift a
portion of their decision-making responsibility to the salesperson (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt,
Frey 2005). Thus, the decision shifts from self decision-making (i.e., making a decision
for oneself) to self-other decision-making (making a decision for someone else) (Polman
2010).
Despite an extensive literature on self decision-making (e.g., Bettman, Luce, and
Payne 1998), there is much less research on self-other decision-making. Whereas selfother research is beginning to emerge across disciplines (e.g., Beisswanger et al. 2003;
Polman 2010; 2012; Wray and Stone 2005), it tends to focus on contextual differences
between self and self-other decision-making (Beisswanger et al. 2003; Wray and Stone
2005). For example, previous research compares self and self-other decision-making in
terms of the amount of information sources consulted (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, and Frey
2005), the indulgence of choices (Laran 2010), and the risk aversion of choice
(Beisswanger et al. 2003). Importantly, although the literature suggests that self and selfother decision-making are made via different processes, prior research has yet to explore
these differences (Lu, Xie, and Xu 2012; Wray and Stone 2005).
In doing this research, we make three key contributions to the literature. First, to
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to forward a process model of
recommendations (self-other decision-making). This process model includes goals,
strategies, and recommendations, and reflects the integration of a primary field study with
the decision-making literature. The model complements and extends prior research on the
self decision-making process in several ways. For instance, unlike the self decision-
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making process which tends to emphasize maximizing accuracy or minimizing effort
goals, the self-other decision-making process emphasizes different goals (i.e., minimizing
negative emotions and maximizing ease of justifying a product). In addition, although we
observed fewer self-other decision-making strategies than those advanced in the self
decision-making literature, we distilled new strategies of self-other decision-making (e.g.,
product homogenization, self-other lexicographic).
Second, we contribute to the literature by highlighting the observable signals that
salespeople provide for their unobservable recommendation goals and strategies.
Drawing upon communication theory (e.g., Mohr and Nevin 1990) and our field research,
we identify six facets of communication that signal the presence or absence of
salespeople’s goals (e.g., directionality, tone). In addition, our research surfaced several
recommendation justifications that signal underlying information processing strategies.
Thus, unlike prior research on self decision-making which infers goals from strategies
(e.g., Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998), our research provides evidence of novel signals
for underlying recommendation goals and strategies.
Third, we provide an integrated framework of the recommendation process via a
set of propositions which link the steps in the process. Doing so provides customers with
a “roadmap” of how salespeople may come to recommend the products they do, such that
customers can then determine the extent to which they integrate the recommendation into
their own decision-making. Thus, we address calls from the literature to provide research
which serves to better educate customers on how to make good purchasing decisions
when incorporating other’s advice (e.g., Bazerman 2001).
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The insights we provide in this research are based on a grounded theory approach
(e.g, Glaser and Straus 1967; Spiggle 1994; Strauss 1987; Strauss and Corbin 1990). In
particular, we covertly audio-recorded 71 sales encounters with retail salespeople in their
natural setting (i.e., retail stores). Such an approach allows the salesperson-customer
experience to unfold naturally (Belk, Sherry, and Wallendorf 1988), which affords a
richer knowledge of the topic area and data that is not contrived (Wilson 2001).
Moreover, this approach lends credibility to our findings by producing unfiltered,
naturalistic data, which does not suffer from informants’ limited memory recall (Finn
2001), discrepancies between reported and actual behavior, and a variety of desirability
biases that may occur with surveys, off-site interviews, and focus groups (Friedrichs and
Ludtke 1975).
3.2

Background
The emerging self-other decision-making literature falls within the greater context

of decision-making, which to date has emphasized why and how a decision is made for
oneself (e.g., customers or salespeople deciding which product to purchase for
themselves) (e.g., Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982;
Yates 1990). Decision-making is understood to be an adaptive and constructive process,
even when facing familiar choices (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993). Research in this
area has explored the process by which customers make decisions (e.g., Bettman, Luce,
and Payne 1998), the factors that influence the process (e.g., Pham 1998), and outcomes
of the process (e.g., Greenleaf and Lehmann 1995; Tsiros and Mittal 2000).
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Surprisingly, sparse attention has been given to the complementary stream of selfother decision-making, in which decisions are made for others (e.g., a salesperson
deciding which product to recommend to a customer). The literature identifies two types
of self-other decision-makers: advisors, who make a recommendation while the ultimate
choice is left to the customer (e.g., a salesperson recommending a product) and proxy
decision-makers, who make a choice on behalf of someone else without their final
consent (e.g., a politician voting or doctor treating an unconscious patient) (e.g., Lu, Xie,
and Xu 2012; Polman 2012). The present research focuses on self-other decision-makers
in the ‘advisor’ role, as it is far more relevant to the role and duties of salespeople.
Research suggests that self-other decision-makers make different choices than self
decision-makers (e.g., Bonaccio and Dalal 2006; Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey 2005; Lu,
Xie, and Xu 2012). For example, previous research has drawn upon regulatory focus
theory (Polman 2012) and construal level theory (Lu, Xie, and Xu 2012) to suggest that,
compared to making decisions for themselves, self-other decision-makers tend to consult
more information sources (Polman 2010; Jonas and Frey 2003), make more indulgent
choices (Laran 2010), have greater predecisional distortion (Polman 2010), experience
different levels of emotion (Beisswanger et al. 2003; Kray 2000), and may make riskier
choices (Stone and Allgaier 2008).
Thus, although prior research suggests a self decision-making process (Bettman,
Luce, and Payne 1998) and compares aspects of the choices made in a self decisionmaking context to the recommendations made in a self-other decision-making context, to
the best of our knowledge no research has attempted to establish nor illuminate the
distinctive process by which self-other decisions are made. We begin to address this void
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by drawing upon field data as well as literature from marketing, communication,
psychology, and economics to generate a model of the self-other (recommendation)
decision-making process.
3.3

Method
In order to gain initial insights into salesperson recommendation behaviors, the

authors conducted an extensive, inductive qualitative study via covert participant
observation (see Appendix A2.1 for IRB approval). Participant observation affords
researchers the opportunity to observe and understand salesperson behaviors in their
natural environment, from which themes, patterns, and anomalies emerge (e.g., Arnould
and Price 1993; Bernthal, Crockett, and Rose 2005; Canniford and Shankar 2013; Celsi,
Rose, and Leigh 1993; Coulter, Price, and Feick 2003; Peñaloza 1994; Schouten and
McAlexander 1995; Tumbat and Belk 2011). Participation observation at the interaction
site of interest (e.g., retailer) also allows the experience to unfold naturally (Belk, Sherry,
and Wallendorf 1988), which allows researchers to develop a richer knowledge of the
topic area and produces data that is not contrived (Wilson 2001). Furthermore, the data
does not suffer from informants’ limited memory recall (Finn 2001), discrepancies
between reported and actual behavior, and a variety of desirability biases that may occur
with retrospective surveys, off-site interviews, and focus groups (Friedrichs and Ludtke
1975). The first author conducted all participant observations. The second author was
purposely excluded from the data collection to ensure independent cross-validation and
reality-checking (Celsi, Rose, and Leigh 1993).
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For this study, the first author went undercover to assume the role of a customer
and engaged in 76 selling encounters with actual salespeople from three large retailers. A
similar form of information gathering known as mystery shopping occurs regularly in
practice as a means to assess service quality and employee performance (Wilson 2001).
Mystery shopping is an emerging and valuable method of data collection in the marketing
academic literature (e.g., Ainscough and Motley 2000; Bone, Christensen, and Williams
2014; Fin 2001) because it lends credibility to the findings by producing unfiltered,
naturalistic data. Furthermore, mystery shopping in the actual retail location allows the
researcher to capture evidence that would likely not be accessible via other
methodologies (e.g., product counts, product availability by manufacturer, and
conversation duration times). However, unlike previous research following this method,
we audio-recorded the encounters to allow for in-depth analysis of the content and
structure of the conversations.
3.3.1

Role of the Authors
The authors’ preconceived perceptions of salesperson recommendation behavior

may influence this work in several ways. Most importantly, both authors are typical
customers involved in transactions with salespeople on a regular basis. In addition, both
have at least five years of experience in corporate sales with different multi-line
dealerships. In those positions, they were given full discretion over which particular
manufacturers’ products to recommend to clients, and are aware of several factors that
influenced those decisions (e.g., fulfilment of personal financial goals). While all efforts
are made to ensure objectivity, it is possible that some of the findings of this research are
unconsciously influenced by the authors’ knowledge and experience with the customer-
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salesperson relationship from both perspectives. However, these experiences also lend
credibility to the findings by providing the authors with a broader understanding of the
topic area. Furthermore, this study makes use of audio-recording and transcription to
limit the authors’ undue influence on data.
3.3.2

Sample
Participants were recruited for this study via purposive sampling, which involves

selecting participants according to the specific needs and criteria of the study (Berg 2009;
Lincoln and Guba 1985; Miles and Huberman 1994). The key criterion for inclusion in
this study is that the individual was an appliance salesperson at one of the three selected
large retailers. Each salesperson was individually approached by the first author. In no
instances did multiple salespeople approach the author, such that one had to be randomly
selected. Of the 76 sales encounters, one salesperson did not provide consent to
participate in the study, and four salespeople were unavailable to provide consent due to
termination of employment and retirement prior to the debriefing date. This resulted in a
final sample size of 71, with no individual store location or salesperson being included
more than once.
Descriptive demographic information for each salesperson was recorded in the
Encounter Log (Table 3.1), including their approximate age (under 30, 30-60, or over
60), gender, and ethnicity (White, African American, Hispanic, Asian) based on the first
author’s observation (Bernthal, Crockett, and Rose 2005; Bradford 2015; Canniford and
Shankar 2013; Peñaloza 1994; Tumbat and Belk 2011). The sample consisted of 67%

63

males and 33% females, of which 15% were under 30 years old, 68% were 30-60 years
old, and 17% were over 60 years old.
3.3.3 Procedure
This study involved deception (Christensen 1988) such that the retail salespeople
believed that they were selling to a real potential customer. The sales encounters occurred
over a one month period during the summer of 2013. The encounters took place across
four states and included a total of 2,116 miles driven. Three large national retail chains
were selected rather than small stores to allow for additional comparison of processes
within one chain of stores – a distinction that would not be possible in stores with few
locations (i.e., local appliance stores). The three retail chains were selected because they
are of similar size, similar organizational structure, and offer the same manufacturers’
products. All sales encounters occurred between the hours of 6:45am and 8:30pm on
Tuesdays during non-holiday times to avoid the high-traffic weekend periods and the risk
of sales efforts being dependent on promotional holiday pricing.
The first author entered each store wearing black shorts, an unmarked white tshirt, white socks, gray tennis shoes, and a neon pink hat. Aside from the hat, the clothing
was intended to be basic and neutral as to minimize stereotyping that could be elicited by
branded clothing. She carried her keys, wallet, and a folded piece of notebook paper that
had the appearance of a short shopping list containing the following items:
“brush/rollers”, “light bulb for front porch”, and “stove?” (Figure 3.2). Upon entering the
appliance department in each retailer (see Figure 3.3 for a typical appliance department
layout), she purposefully stood in a ‘neutral’ location at the end of a row of electric
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ranges so as to not appear to have already considered a particular model or be more
interested in a particular model than others. When approached, she expressed to the
salesperson that she and her husband were planning to purchase a range the following
weekend, but had jointly decided that she would come in to meet with a salesperson
beforehand3.
Throughout the encounters, she responded to questions as asked and maintained
the same set of responses via a predetermined set of question responses (Table 3.2). The
predetermined responses were developed by pretesting them with three local retailers
prior to the formal study to determine commonly-asked questions, and to ensure that
every salesperson had information available to them to recommend an array of ranges.
The predetermined set of responses was iteratively refined for accuracy and relevance to
a natural sales encounter (Peñaloza 1994), and included responses for questions like the
budget, the metal finish, and the amount of cooking done on a weekly basis. If an
additional question arose during an encounter that did not have a predetermined response,
the author answered the question honestly as she would in real life and maintained that
same response if the question arose in another encounter. This ensured a programmatic
and systematic approach to the encounters, and maximized the reliability of findings
(Wilson 2001). She had a short interview guide (Appendix A2.2) (Coulter, Price, and
Feick 2003) memorized with general questions that allowed her to ensure that each
salesperson was given the opportunity to make a recommendation. She then allowed the
sales encounter to unfold naturally. The author did not proactively provide her needs or

3

A stipulation of IRB approval required that the author inform salespeople upfront that she would not be
making a purchase that particular day so that they were not left with disappointment or concerns over their
selling abilities when she indeed did not make a purchase.
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preferences in any encounter, but reactively responded to every question using the
response guide. Oftentimes, after a recommendation was provided, the salesperson
offered a printout with the product information. If that did not occur, the author took a
photograph on her cell phone (e.g., Schouten and McAlexander 1995) or wrote down the
model number on her shopping list in order to verify final recommendations and later
align them with objective rankings. At the end of each encounter, the author thanked the
salesperson for their help and left the store without making a purchase. No purchase of
any kind was made at any store across the 71 encounters. At some point during each sales
encounter (typically before being approached by a salesperson), the author recorded the
number of electric ranges on the floor that fell within a predetermined set of product
responses (i.e., parameters; for example, $1000 budget, electric, stainless finish). This
was to ensure that all salespeople were able to proceed through a recommendation
process to choose a product to propose rather than having to recommend a particular
product only because no other options were available. Indeed, in all encounters the
number of products available on the floor within the set of parameters ranged from 6 to
21, with an average of 13.
The process of debriefing informants coincided with their right to confidentiality.
The salesperson’s first name was written down as a part of the Encounter Log (Table
3.1). Within two weeks of each sales encounter, the first author called the store’s main
phone number and asked to speak with that particular salesperson in the appliance
department. This process ensured that she did not need to record or safeguard their full
name or email address (which typically includes a full name). If the salesperson was not
working, she attempted to contact them on a weekly basis. The Encounter Log was
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updated regularly with the date of debrief call attempts, the date the debriefing actually
occurred, and the salesperson’s response to the debriefing. Once on the phone, she
explained to them that she was recently in the store and had on a neon pink hat, which
was a memorable, yet realistic item that served to help the salesperson recall the specific
encounter. The author then debriefed the salesperson by following a prepared script
(Appendix A2.3). As requested by IRB, all debriefing-related information was deleted
from the files after consent was obtained or denied to protect the informants’ anonymity.
3.3.4

Special Considerations
Special considerations were made throughout the entire data collection procedure

to minimize risk or harm to the informants, retailers, product manufacturers, and author,
as well as to ensure a systematic, scientific procedure. In safeguarding the salespeople,
any potential loss of income as a result of participation in the study was mitigated by
ensuring that the three large retail chains offer compensation plans based on salary rather
than commission. This was verified by at least one salesperson from each of the three
retail chains. Additionally, the author waited to enter the appliance area until it was clear
of all other customers, and (although it never happened) was prepared to excuse herself
immediately if another customer entered the area, such that any loss of potential store
profits were mitigated. This meant that the store did not lose overall sales by having
salespeople talk to the author rather than selling to other customers. No manufacturer
documentation was accepted (e.g., manufacturer brochures, pamphlets, flyers) to mitigate
the cost of this study to the manufacturers.
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To enhance the validity of this study, an electric range4 was chosen as the product
of interest because it is a realistic item that a thirty-something married female would
purchase. Furthermore, because appliances are involved, non-regular purchases,
salespeople are oftentimes consulted before a customer choice is made. The stores were
not informed of this study to mitigate the likelihood of management tipping off
employees that the research may occur in their department, which would invalidate the
data. Furthermore, store management may have steered the author towards, or only
allowed access to, a particular set of stores to study (e.g., high-performing stores or lowperforming stores), which would provide a biased sample of salespeople and stores.
3.3.5

Data
Within five minutes of each encounter’s completion, the Encounter Log (Table

3.1) was updated and field notes were made by the first author. The field notes and sales
encounters were audio recorded (Bradford 2015; Canniford and Shankar 2013; Schouten
and McAlexander 1995). Audio recording, followed immediately by transcription, is the
most thorough and complete form of field notes, and is in line with the verbatim
principle, such that the researcher “must make a verbatim record of what people say”
(Spradley 1979, p. 73). Audio recording ensures that the data is not filtered or translated
through the researcher’s perceptions of what is occurring, but rather is verbatim from the
salesperson. Missing out on key details captured in the informant’s wording can cause a
loss of key data from the study. Recording conversations without dual consent is a legal

The term ‘range’ is often used interchangeably with the terms ‘oven’ or ‘stove’. All three retailers in this
study, as well as Consumer Reports, refer to a cooking appliance which encompasses both an oven and a
stovetop as a ‘range’. Thus, we refer to it here as a ‘range’.
4
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practice in all four states where the study was conducted. The audio recording device
used to record the conversations was an 8GB USB Pen Drive Digital Audio Voice
Recorder, which was attached to the author’s keychain during the time of the study
(Figure 3.2). This device recorded at a speed of 128bps, capturing 898 total minutes
(roughly 15 hours) of recorded data including both encounters and field notes. Each
encounter was recorded as a .wav file, and was downloaded onto a computer via the
integrated USB drive to allow for transcription via a third-party transcription service. The
author’s field notes were a separate recording which served to capture immediate
thoughts and reactions immediately following each encounter (Canniford and Shankar
2013; Peñaloza 1994; Tumbat and Belk 2011). The first author also noted the date, time,
recommendation, number of available models on the floor, and any additional details
specific to that encounter that could be used to verify the transcriptions. The author’s
audio-recorded field notes were transcribed as described above.
3.3.6

Analysis
We independently read the entire set of transcripts to get a general sense for the

nature of the encounters (Spiggle 1994). Over numerous meetings, we discussed
emerging themes and patterns across the 71 encounters, and debated their distinctiveness
and relevance to the topic (Canniford and Shankar 2013; Celsi, Rose, and Leigh 1993;
Schouten and McAlexander 1995). As recommended by Spiggle (1994), we documented
these discussions in an ongoing set of notes that both authors edited and contributed to.
An initial, overarching recommendation process emerged which consisted of six large
categories. Similar to Bone, Christensen, and Williams (2014), Holt (1995), and
McQuarrie, Miller, and Phillips (2013), we used the iterative, constant comparison
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procedure to contrast and differentiate the categories, as well as compare them to existing
literature across disciplines (Glaser 1956). As a result of this procedure, the original six
categories were collapsed into a three-step process model consisting of goals, strategies,
and recommendations. We refined the dimensions of each step (i.e., the five different
strategies within the strategy step) through reference to literature and our field study (e.g.,
Schilpzand, Hekman, and Mitchell 2014). Throughout this analysis, the identification of
steps and dimensions within the encounters were organized using QSR International’s
NVivo 10 coding software. We met regularly to resolve any discrepancies via discussion,
and to confer that all findings were grounded in the data (Bone, Christensen, and
Williams 2014; Peñaloza 1994).
3.4

Recommendation Process Model
From our field study, a three-step process emerged by which salespeople make

recommendations to customers (Figure 3.4). This recommendation process consists of (1)
goals, (2) strategies, and (3) recommendations, with several dimensions within each step
(e.g., four observed goals within the first step). In the following sections, we draw upon
observations from the sales encounters and previous research to define and examine these
steps, as well as construct propositions which integrate the recommendation process
model.
3.4.1

Goals
Goals reflect the motivations driving a salesperson’s recommendation (e.g.,

Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998; Luce 1998). Previous research suggest that goals stem
from various characteristics of the decision context, such as the timeline, availability of
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feedback regarding the decision, and environment (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998). Our
study suggests that salespeople are motivated by goals similar to those of individuals
making decisions for themselves. However, as we will note, the prevalence with which
each type of goal is pursued varies significantly between self and self-other decisionmakers. Salesperson recommendation goals are: to maximize the accuracy of their
recommendation, to minimize their effort in providing a recommendation, to minimize
negative emotions they experience when providing a recommendation, and to maximize
the ease of justifying their recommendation to the customer. These goals are not mutually
exclusive and can occur simultaneously in varying degrees. Furthermore, goals are often
constructed on-the-spot and fluctuate throughout a single sales encounter (Bettman, Luce,
and Payne 1998; Dhar and Gorlin 2013; Payne, Bettman, Johnson 1993; Slovic 1995) as
well as across multiple customers (e.g., Dhar and Novemsky 2008). Thus, a salesperson
may be driven by one goal with their first customer of the day and a different goal with
another customer.
The goals motivating a salesperson’s recommendation are difficult to measure
because they are internal and fluctuate (Bettman Luce, and Payne 1998). Therefore, we
draw upon communication theory (Krone, Jablin, and Putnam 1987), as well as the
channel communication literature (e.g., Gross, 1968; Mohr and Nevin 1990), to identify
communication facets that may serve as signals for a salesperson’s goals. Communication
facets have been shown to underlie coordination and satisfaction within channel
relationships (Mohr and Nevin 1990). We identify four facets which describe both the
content and structure of these encounters: duration (i.e., length of the conversation
measured in minutes), directionality as either unilateral (i.e., conversation dominated by
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the salesperson) or bidirectional (i.e., conversation more evenly divided between the
salesperson and the customer), tone as either formal (i.e., strictly professional and salerelated) or informal (i.e., personal questions and colloquial discussion), and focus on
either features of the product itself (i.e., price) (Gross 1968) or evaluations of the product
which could be gathered from a variety of sources (i.e., reference to ratings, reviews,
other customers, previous sales). We observed two additional facets in the study:
objectivity as either subjective (i.e., interjection of the salesperson’s personal opinion) or
objective (i.e., reliance on facts with no personal opinion) and feature-need linkage
(whether or not the salesperson discusses features in terms of customer needs). We now
discuss each of the recommendation goals through the communication facets framework
(Table 3.3).
3.4.1.1 Maximizing Accuracy
We define the goal to maximize accuracy as the extent to which a salesperson is
motivated to seek the best product for a customer based on their unique needs and
preferences (e.g., Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998). By best product, we are referring to
the available product with the closest fit to customer needs. Past self-other decisionmaking research suggests that the amount and type of information discussed during a
conversation results in a better understanding of the other’s preferences (Jonas, SchulzHardt, and Frey 2005). Longer, bilateral encounters allow the salesperson to ask
questions and listen for customer responses, which increases the amount and types of
information received by the salesperson5. Not surprisingly, therefore, our findings

5

Consistent with the consideration set literature, it is typical for a customer to initially remove irrelevant
products from their list of potential alternatives before beginning the actual decision-making process (e.g.,
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suggest that accuracy-driven encounters to be relatively longer and bidirectional. As the
following illustrates, the nature of the conversation also tends to be more informal:
Salesperson: Is it just you and the husband or is there a family…?
Customer: I have a baby.
Salesperson: How fabulous!
Customer: She’s 10 months old so I have some fun.
Salesperson: My kids are 36 and 33 and I still -- my grandkids they
are 10 and 6. I absolutely adore being in the kitchen. My six-year
old grandson can make as good an apple pie as I can. He started
little, like when she’s -- little baby rolling and stuff and it just
becomes first nature to them and they love it. Instead of sitting and
watching TV whenever they come to my house, you can see in their
faces, “Can we go bake? Let’s go bake lady cakes…” So at 10
months she’s ready to handle one and put that little roller in her
hands and working with it and stuff and you’ll go enjoy working
with her later on in the kitchen. So convection is -- if that one had
not had convection on it, I would step over and say take a look at
convection, just in case you really are a homemaker or a baker.
This informal small-talk helps put the customer at ease, which builds rapport
between the customer and salesperson. As the customer becomes more at ease, they are
more honest, open, and forthcoming with information (Taylor and Bogdan 1984). The
salesperson is able to uncover customer needs and preferences which were not explicitly
requested, such as the customer’s growing family in the example above. This particular
salesperson used the information about the customer’s family to not only recommend a
product with convection baking because baking can be a fun family activity, but also to
recommend a product with a large capacity to accommodate more dishes at one time. In

Alba and Chattopadhyay 1985; Howard and Sheth 1969). For example, when purchasing a vehicle, the
customer may eliminate vans and trucks before deciding among all available cars. In concert with this
notion, it is typical that a salesperson ask the customer an initial set of ‘qualifier’ questions to identify the
relevant product category. In the present study, the qualifier question typically referred to a focus on gas or
electric ranges. This initial question did not signal the identification of a customer’s unique needs and
preferences within the product cateogry, but served to determine which (large) set of products were
relevant to the conversation. Assessing customer needs beyond this initial ‘qualifier’ questions constitute
the make-up of facets coded in this study.
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another encounter, the salesperson casually asked about the customer’s and her spouse's
job while searching products online, which sparked the salesperson to show a product
that preheated quickly for families in need of a shorter cooking time.
Previous research suggests that self-other decision-makers tend to seek
information from more sources than self decision-makers (Jonas and Frey 2003; Polman
2010). Thus, a recommendation accuracy goal drives salespeople to present information
based on both features (e.g., attributes of the products, pricing information, available
promotions) and evaluations (e.g., ratings, performance reviews, past sales history). The
following example demonstrates a salesperson’s use of both feature-based information
(i.e., burner size and heating element) and evaluation-based information (i.e.,
performance reviews) during their presentation of product information:

Salesperson: (Manufacturer) makes wonderful stoves. This
particular unit gets a lot of good reviews. One of the more basic
features in terms of use is to get two different burner sizes is here.
You have the hidden elements here. So, there are no coils on the
bottom for things to fall down onto and to solidify. I think there is
also the steam clean model if I'm not mistaken.
Additionally, Jonas and Frey (2003) suggest that, unlike self decision-makers,
self-other decision-makers do not favor information that only confirms their
recommendation. Rather, salespeople pursuing an accuracy goal provide balanced
information (i.e., for and against a product), which ensures the customer is fully-informed
for their final purchase decision, and signals that the salesperson is putting in the time to
consider the strengths and weaknesses of each product. This is demonstrated in the
following encounter, as a salesperson presents the positives and negatives of a product:
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Salesperson: This model has the steam clean. So, it makes the cleanup easier. But the drawback is, that you allow yourself for a little bit
more time for heating up.
As products are being presented and demonstrated, a goal to maximize accuracy
drives a salesperson to present information about products by linking features and
information with the needs of the customer. Furthermore, while linking to customer
needs, it is unlikely that the salesperson emphasizes his personal opinions. In the
following conversation, a salesperson demonstrates these two communication facets by
directly linking his discussion of convection fans to the customer’s response regarding
her oven use, without explicitly interjecting any of his own personal preferences towards
convection fans:
Salesperson: So, what kind of cook are you? Do you guys typically
use the oven a lot for a lot of things?
Customer: I use it four nights a week for dinner and I bake maybe
once a month.
Salesperson: You do a lot of cooking in the oven. Let’s switch over
here because I think that you could actually use a convection. It may
be something that you're not used to, but it’s one of the things that
you will start to develop and may really like.
Based on the preceding arguments, we suggest the following proposition:
P1:

A recommendation goal to maximize accuracy is signaled
by communication with (a) longer duration, (b) bilateral
conversation, (c) an informal tone, (d) a focus on featureand evaluation-based information, (e) objectivity from the
salesperson, (f) and an emphasis on feature-need linkage.

3.4.1.2 Minimizing Effort
We define the goal to minimize effort as the extent to which a salesperson is
motivated to reduce the time and energy expended towards seeking the best product for a

75

customer (e.g., Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998). Prior research suggests that certain
communication facets result in commitment within the channel, where commitment
refers, in part, to the extent to which one channel member (i.e., salesperson) is willing to
exert effort on behalf of another channel member (i.e., customer) (Mohr and Nevins
1990). Thus, the presence or absence of particular communication facets serves as a
signal of a salesperson who is minimizing his effort.
Mohr and Nevins (1990) suggest that conversation duration is a component of
effort, such that minimizing recommendation effort manifests itself in short conversations
that are largely unilateral (i.e., salesperson-dominant). When a conversation is kept short,
the salesperson does not take time to engage the customer or incorporate their feedback.
The salesperson in the following exchange signals a goal to minimize effort by
recommending a product right away without investing time or energy to determine
unique customer needs:
Customer: My husband and I want to buy a stove this weekend and
just don’t know much about them.
Salesperson: Alright. Are you, do you cook a lot?
Customer: Um, three to four times week.
Salesperson: Okay, well, this is going to probably one of the
best. [places hand on product in front of him]
As evidenced above, the tone of the conversation is usually formal6, with little
discussion outside of what is professionally required. Pursuit of this goal is further
evidenced by the salesperson providing evaluation-based information regarding
the product rather than feature-based information. Doing so lessens the amount of

6

Although these conversations tend to be shorter and formal, there were no observations of any salespeople
who appeared to be annoyed or curt during an encounter.
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time and energy exerted to provide detailed feature-based product information to
a customer. This observation is in line with the representative heuristic
(Kahneman and Tversky 1972; Tversky and Kahneman 1971; 1974), which
suggests that salespeople tend to believe that customers act similarly, such that
they assume most customers shopping for a range will share the same preferences
and be satisfied with the same product choice. Therefore, salespeople rely on
evaluation-based feedback demonstrating that they assume the current customer
will want the same product as other customers:

Customer: Okay. Why would you consider these? What about
them makes them the best?
Salesperson: Mainly, it’s just the feedback I hear back from
customers.
Minimizing effort drives salespeople to offer few opinions or subjective
preferences, which would require additional time, thought, and energy. While minimizing
effort results in less discussion of features with a customer, when a salesperson does
present features, they are unlikely to link to the customer’s needs. This point is evidenced
by the following exchange in which a salesperson discusses features of a product
(convection fan and 6 cu. foot capacity) without prior knowledge of, or reference to, the
customer’s needs regarding convection or capacity:
Salesperson: This [model] is a nice range. It’s got the triple
convection fan; it’s got the bigger cavity. It’s a 6 cubic foot cavity.
Customer: That’s big.
Salesperson: And then there’s the triple convection fan.
As a result of these observations, we offer the following proposition:
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P2:

A recommendation goal to minimize effort is signaled by
communication with (a) shorter duration, (b) unilateral
conversation, (c) a formal tone, (d) a focus on evaluationbased information, (e) objectivity from the salesperson, (f)
and minimal emphasis on feature-need linkage.

3.4.1.3 Minimizing Negative Emotions
We define the goal to minimize negative emotions as the extent to which a
salesperson is motivated to reduce the uncomfortable feelings associated with the
responsibility of recommending the best product to a customer (e.g., Luce 1998).
Drawing upon Lazarus’ (1991) theory of emotion elicitation, the first step in a
salesperson generating emotions is assessing the level of his responsibility with a process.
In the second step, he assesses the emotions he may feel after the recommendation
process as either negative or positive. Finally, he identifies the exact emotion he may
feel. Correspondingly, we argue that salespeople first recognize that they play a
significant role in the recommendation process because the customer has sought their
help. Then they recognize the potential for negative emotions if they recommend the
wrong product, or positive emotions if they recommend the best product. They further
identify these emotions as guilt and regret (Janis and Mann 1977), or satisfaction,
respectively. Thus, the salesperson is driven to minimize the potential feeling of guilt
associated with their responsibility if the best product is not recommended.
In contrast to self decision-making which suggests two methods for coping with
negative emotions (i.e., problem-focused coping and emotion-focused coping) (e.g.,
Folkman and Lazarus 1988; Luce 1998), we observe that salespeople tend to cope with
negative emotions via one method: emotion-focused coping in the form of minimizing
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their responsibility. Thus, salespeople tend to focus on the negative emotion (i.e.,
potential guilt) and avoid it by reducing their responsibility in the recommendation
process. Correspondingly, customer encounters tend to be shorter, unilateral, and formal
because the salesperson is de-emphasizing the recommendation process altogether. One
of our key findings is that salespeople tend to reduce their responsibility by deflecting it
back onto the customer. For instance:
Customer: Is there any particular one that you would recommend?
Salesperson: I can’t recommend anything. I could tell you what each
one offers, like, their information. I can do that. The choice is
ultimately yours.
In a different encounter, the salesperson deflects responsibility by reminding the
customer that the choice is ultimately theirs (i.e., “whatever you choose”):

Salesperson: Well, I mean to be honest with you, I never owned [that
model] but I can tell you that whatever you choose, I know you are
going to be happy with it.
By deflecting responsibility back onto customers, salespeople are essentially
attempting to share blame if the wrong product is recommended or purchased. Dunning,
Pecotich, and O'Cass (2004) suggest that sharing blame with a third party can reduce an
individual’s feelings of responsibility with a decision. Furthermore, previous self-other
decision-making literature has suggested that the further someone removes themselves
from the decision-making context, the more likely they are to think abstractly and
generalized rather than focusing on fine details (Trope and Liberman 2003). Therefore,
salespeople who are driven to minimize responsibility are less focused on detail-oriented
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feature-based product information and are more likely to refer to evaluation-based
information.
While minimizing responsibility makes it less likely that a salesperson offers a
personal opinion, when they do, they are more likely to add a disclaimer to state that it
may not reflect customer needs. In doing so, they downplay their role and indirectly place
the responsibility back on the customer. This point is exemplified in the following
salesperson’s disclaimer that the information they are sharing regarding the price of the
product is “just personal opinion”. This salesperson implies that he should not be held
responsibility for his personal opinions and the customer will need to form their own:
Customer: So is there a particular manufacturer that you
recommend?
Salesperson: [Manufacturer] does good cooking. I feel they are little
overpriced for some of the stuff that they do but it depends on what
model you're looking at and that's just my personal opinion on their
stuff. It’s really based on your brand preference.
Based on the preceding arguments, we propose:
P3:

A recommendation goal to minimize negative emotion is
signaled by communication with (a) shorter duration, (b)
unilateral conversation, (c) a formal tone, (d) a focus on
evaluation-based information, (e) subjectivity from the
salesperson, (f) and minimal emphasis on feature-need
linkage.

3.4.1.4 Maximizing Ease of Justification
We define the goal to maximize the ease of justification as the extent to which a
salesperson is motivated to recommend product(s) with the simplest explanation (e.g.,
Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998). Salespeople with this goal attempt to make the
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recommendation process as psychologically easy for themselves as possible by seeking a
product to recommend because it has an easily-justifiable attribute (e.g., recommending
the range with the lowest price) or attributes (e.g., recommending a range that has most of
the features that customers typically like) (Zajonc 1980). Recommendations are self-other
decisions that exist entirely in a social context with other people (i.e., customers). Thus,
the salesperson is expected to be able to justify her recommendation to the customer
requesting it. While this goal is often associated with minimizing effort, it may be a result
of previous sales experience in which the salesperson has developed a heuristic of which
products sell well (e.g., a particular manufacturer or a particular price point) compared to
those that do not (Shafir, Simonson, Tversky 1993).
When a salesperson is pursuing a goal to maximize the ease of justifying her
recommendations, she is making the process psychologically easy for herself by focusing
on the reasons to recommend a product rather than focusing on the product itself (e.g.,
Dhar and Gorlin 2013; Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky 1993; Simonson 1989). For
example, a salesperson perceives a product in terms of the many ways it can be justified
(e.g., fewest customer returns or lowest price) rather than looking at a product as a whole
set of feature-based and evaluation-based attributes. Oftentimes, the salesperson is
excessively focused on the justifications of a product, such that they begin discussing
justifications even before assessing customer needs (e.g., Shafir, Simonson, Tversky
1993). For example, in the following encounter a salesperson focuses on the justification
of her recommendation (triple burner), before taking time to ask about customer needs
and matching them to the products available:
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Customer: My husband and I plan to buy a range this weekend and
don’t know much about them.
Salesperson: Do you cook a lot?
Customer: Three to four times week.
Salesperson: I would go with the GE just because I love the triple
burner. You can use any sized-pan you want there and then you got
the two standard here too.
Because the salesperson de-emphasizes customer needs, these conversations tend
to be shorter in duration and unilateral in nature, with the salesperson doing most of the
talking. The goal of maximizing ease of justification implies that the salesperson is
aiming to simplify the process for themselves, which is better accomplished when the
tone is informal so that the customer is comfortable and trusting without pushing back or
arguing (Spradley 1979).
Bettman, Luce, Payne (1998) suggest that a goal to maximize ease of justification
drives decision-makers to weigh the outcome of the decision (i.e., performance of the
product) more heavily than the process leading to the decision (i.e., processing of
attributes). Similarly, we suggest that a goal to maximize the ease of justification drives
salespeople to rely more heavily on evaluation-based information sources that tend to
emphasize performance of the product (e.g., customer returns, reviews or complaints
after using the product) rather than feature-based information. This point is made
explicitly clear in the following exchange:
Customer: Why do you love [this model]?
Salesperson: It works.
Customer: It works, okay.
Salesperson: You have very few service problems.
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As a result of not taking the time to extensively uncover needs throughout the
conversation, the salesperson is not able to link the justifications they are providing with
the customer’s needs or preferences. Thus, there is minimal feature-need linkage. Given
the preceding observations, we suggest the following:

P4:

A recommendation goal to maximize ease of justification is
signaled by communication with (a) shorter duration, (b)
unilateral conversation, (c) an informal tone, (d) a focus on
evaluation-based information, (e) subjectivity from the
salesperson, (f) and minimal emphasis on feature-need
linkage.

3.4.1.5 Goals Discussion
Drawing upon our field study and constant comparison to the literature, our
research on self-other recommendation goals complements previous literature on self
decision-making goals. However, there is a sharp contrast in the prevalence of the four
goals. The self decision-making literature suggests that maximizing accuracy and
minimizing effort are the two most prevalent goals, with the desire to trade-off between
these two goals as the driving force for the rest of the decision-making process (Bettman,
Luce, and Payne 1998; Dhar and Gorlin 2013; Johnson and Payne 1985; Payne 1982).
Alternatively, findings that emerge from our observations indicate that the least prevalent
goals observed among salespeople are maximizing accuracy and minimizing effort.
Instead, there is strong evidence that minimizing negative emotion and maximizing ease
of justification are the most commonly pursued goals by salespeople. This may be
because the salesperson is employed to regularly apply effort towards helping customers
choose the best product. With accuracy and effort expected by the nature of their
employment, the salesperson then toggles between the desire to make the
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recommendation process easier for themselves and minimize their negative emotions
throughout the process.
In addition, unlike previous self decision-making research which suggests that
decision-making strategies signal underlying decision-making goals, our research
suggests that communication facets can serve as signals for underlying decision-making
goals. Like prior self decision-making research, however, we observe that goals prompt
different strategies that salespeople use in processing information about the products
available. Next, we discuss the types of strategies that salespeople use in the
recommendation process.
3.4.2

Strategies
A strategy is the information processing method a salesperson uses to evaluate

product alternatives (e.g., Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998). This includes the
determination of which attributes are evaluated (e.g., price and burner size) and how the
importance of those attributes are weighted (e.g., price is most important). Much like the
recommendation goals discussed earlier, it is difficult to observe the information
processing strategies used by salespeople unless they are explicitly manipulated (e.g.,
Kray 2000; Fischhoff 1992; Kray and Gonzalez 1999). Thus, in the same way that
observable communication facets can signal unobservable goals, we suggest that
observable justifications can signal unobservable strategies.
Prior research suggests that self-other decision-makers evaluate attributes of
products differently than self decision-makers do (e.g., Kray 2000, Fischhoff 1992, Kray
and Gonazales 1999; Tversky et al., 1988). Similarly, our findings suggest that only two
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of the well-known ‘self’ strategies were observed among salespeople: lexicographic and
equal weight7. Use of these simpler strategies by salespeople is consistent with previous
research which suggests that as the decision-making process becomes more complex, the
strategy used to process information tends to become simpler (Bettman, Luce, and Payne
1998). A recommendation made for a customer is more complex than a choice made by a
customer due to difficulties in eliciting and decoding pertinent and accurate customer
information as well as in integrating potentially conflicting preferences between
salespeople and customers.
A lexicographic strategy emphasizes one attribute at a time, such that the
salesperson processes information to determine which product ranks highest on a single
attribute (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998). If there is tie among products on the most
important attribute (e.g., price is most important and two products have the same low
price), then those products are further evaluated on the second most important attribute.
For example, among the two products with the same low price, the salesperson may
evaluate them based on the number of burners such that the product with the most
burners (and lowest price) emerges as the single dominant product. This is consistent
with prior research on self-other decision-making (e.g., Kray 2000; Kray and Gonzalez
1999; Lu, Xie, and Xu 2012), which suggests that people making decisions for others
tend to anchor on fewer attributes, while people making decisions for themselves tend to
consider many attributes. We argue that use of a lexicographic strategy is evidenced by
salespeople providing a single justification for the product they recommend.

7

Salespeople may use more than these two strategies when processing information; however, our study
surfaced use of only these two established strategies.
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We find additional evidence that salespeople process information via an equal
weight strategy. An equal weight strategy emphasizes more than one attribute at a time,
such that the salesperson processes information to determine which product(s) rank
highest on multiple attributes; however, those attributes are not weighted for importance
(Bettman, Luce, Payne 1998). For example, a salesperson may evaluate products based
on three attributes: the number of burners, price, and Consumer Reports ranking.
Notably, we did not observe any instances in which salespeople explicitly weighted
multiple attributes (e.g., valued price as the most important attribute, then number of
burners, then Consumer Reports ranking). Thus, several products which have similar
rankings for the three attributes may emerge as the dominant products. We argue that the
use of this strategy is signaled by salespeople providing a list of justifications (typically
three or more) without emphasizing any particular one.
Unlike prior research, our observations suggest that these two strategies can be
further distinguished based on the locus of the strategy – either self or self-other. Here,
self strategies are signaled by justifications emphasizing the salesperson’s needs or
preferences8, while self-other strategies are signaled by justifications which largely
reflect the customer’s needs or preferences. We use the term “largely” because it is likely
difficult for salespeople to completely remove their own preferences from their
information processing.

Throughout this research, “self” decision-making refers to decision-making for oneself. Thus, a self
strategy used by salespeople refers to decision-making based on their preferences (i.e., self decisionmaking does not have to refer only to customer decision-making based on customer preferences).
8
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Research from psychology suggests that decision-makers often act on intuitive,
nonconscious processes (e.g., quickly applying rules of thumb or recommending products
they are familiar with) rather than deliberate information-processing strategies (e.g.,
Kahneman 2003). Thus, despite sales training or management direction to listen to
customer needs, it is possible that salespeople revert back to a reliance on particular
attributes that are important to them (self strategies) rather than consciously processing
attributes that are important to their customer (self-other strategies). Thus, the distinction
of self and self-other strategies manifests itself in four distinct strategies: self
lexicographic, self equal weight, self-other lexicographic, and self-other equal weight.
A key finding in this study is the emergence of fifth strategy of information
processing: product homogenization. A salesperson using a product homogenization
strategy emphasizes the similarities among the products rather than the differences.
Interestingly, all self decision-making strategies highlight differences in alternative
products in hopes that one of the alternatives emerges as dominant. For example, one’s
lexicographic strategy involves differentiating products based on one attribute such that
the highest scoring product for that particular attribute emerges as the dominant choice.
However, with the product homogenization strategy, salespeople are processing (i.e.,
looking for) the similarities in the alternative products rather than the differences. Next,
we discuss each of the recommendation strategies and their justification signals (Figure
3.1).
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3.4.2.1 Self Lexicographic
Use of a self lexicographic strategy is signaled by a salesperson providing one
justification for their recommendation, in which the justification is an attribute of
importance to the salesperson. The emphasis on salesperson, rather than customer, needs
and preferences suggests that information processing can occur independently of the
conversation with the customer, during which customer needs and preferences could have
been uncovered. Use of one justification signals that the salesperson finds one attribute to
be of utmost importance. This strategy is exemplified in the following encounter with the
salesperson justifying her recommendation based on one attribute (capacity) that is
important to her rather than the customer. She makes this clear by emphasizing that it’s
an attribute that she likes.
Customer: You would recommend this one?
Salesperson: Yeah. I like this one because there is a lot of room in
there and you can put several things in there. I mean, it’s really,
really big capacity. I like that.
In a different encounter, the salesperson follows a similar self lexicographic
strategy in processing information based on cleaning capabilities, which is important to
her, but never discussed vis-à-vis her customer’s needs:
Customer: So, is this the one that you would recommend?
Salesperson: [Manufacturer] has this one that I like for their
cleaning. It’s has the aqua clean technology. This is the one I
recommend. The [manufacturer] with the aqua clean, I really do like
that.
Use of the self lexicographic strategy implies that salespeople do not link their
information processing with customer needs. This may be because a salesperson does not
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invest time and energy to uncover customer needs, or that he seeks to simplify the
process for himself by reverting to his personal preferences which are easier to justify. It
is unlikely that a salesperson who is maximizing accuracy and spending time uncovering
customer needs would ignore those needs completely and process information via this
strategy. Furthermore, salespeople minimizing negative emotion seek to minimize the
potential blame associated with recommending a particular product to a customer. Thus,
it is unlikely that they would process information based on their own personal
preferences which may not reflect customer needs and could increase the likelihood of
customer blame. As such, we propose that salespeople who have not taken the time to
uncover needs, or those that seek the easiest justification for a product, are more likely to
process information via a self lexicographic strategy:

P5:

Salespeople who use a self lexicographic recommendation strategy
are likely to have minimizing effort and maximizing ease of
justification as underlying goals.

3.4.2.2 Self Equal Weight
Use of a self equal weight strategy is signaled by a salesperson providing multiple
unweighted justifications for their recommendation, in which the justifications are of
importance to the salesperson. Thus, similar to the self lexicographic strategy, the
salesperson using a self equal weight strategy does not link justifications of a
recommendation to the customer’s needs or preferences. A self equal weight strategy
may also be indicative of a salesperson with a list of unweighted justifications for why
they believe a particular product is the best one, such that they have sought a product
which will be easy to recommend due to its generally high scores across several equally
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important attributes. In the following encounter, a salesperson processes information
about the product alternatives using an equal weight strategy, signaled by a list of
unweighted attributes (price, burner size, warming center, convection, hidden heating
unit). However, because attributes are not linked to any needs or preferences of the
customer, it implies that the justifications are important to the salesperson:
Customer: Which one would you recommend?
Salesperson: This one. It’s usually $1,200.00 and it's on sale for
$950.00. There's a big difference with this one. This gives you
twelve, nine and six inch burner, and a warming center. This gives
you the true European convection in here. It's actually got a double
fan with the heating element wrapped around it and that gives you
the uniform heat throughout. The heating unit for the oven is
actually underneath that tray so if you spill something, it doesn't spill
onto the heating unit.
Similar to the self lexicographic strategy, the self equal weight strategy implies
that the salesperson has not uncovered customer needs, or simplifies the process for
herself by reverting back to her personal preferences which are easy to justify. Thus, it is
unlikely that a salesperson who is maximizing accuracy would process information via
this self strategy. Additionally, salespeople minimizing negative emotion seek to
minimize the potential blame associated with recommending a particular product and,
therefore, would likely be hesitant to process information based on their personal
preferences. As such, we propose that salespeople who have not taken the time to
uncover needs, or those that seek the easiest justification for a product, are more likely to
process via a self equal weight strategy:

P6:

Salespeople who use a self equal weight recommendation strategy
are likely to have minimizing effort and maximizing ease of
justification as underlying goals.
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3.4.2.3 Self-other Lexicographic
Use of a self-other lexicographic strategy is signaled by a salesperson providing
one justification for their recommendation, in which the justification largely reflects the
customer’s needs and preferences. Due to the design of this study in which the author did
not overtly anchor on one attribute, this strategy was unobserved. Although unobserved,
it is certainly likely that salespeople may process information about products based on
one attribute that is very important to the customer. For example, if a customer tells the
salesperson that they are looking for the least expensive range, the salesperson will likely
evaluate products based solely on price and recommend the least expensive range.
A self-other lexicographic strategy suggests that a salesperson has uncovered a
need or preference of a customer and integrated it into the evaluation of products. Thus, it
is likely that a salesperson who is maximizing accuracy may process information about
the products available based on the most important attribute to a unique customer.
Furthermore, incorporating customer needs into the evaluation and scoring of products
allows the salesperson to share blame with the customer if the best product is not
recommended. Thus, those salespeople who are maximizing accuracy or minimizing
negative emotion are likely to use this self-other strategy. Alternatively, a salesperson
who is minimizing effort or maximizing ease of justification simplifies the process for
themselves and does not likely uncover customer needs and, therefore, would not
evaluate products using a self-other strategy. Thus, we present the following proposition:

P7:

Salespeople who use a self-other lexicographic recommendation
strategy are likely to have maximizing accuracy or minimizing
negative emotion as underlying goals.
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3.4.2.4 Self-other Equal Weight
Use of a self-other equal weight strategy is signaled by a salesperson providing a
set of justifications for their recommendation, in which the justifications largely reflect
the customer’s needs and preferences. Similar to self-other lexicographic, this strategy
signals that the salesperson is recommending a product based on what will satisfy the
unique needs of the customer. We find evidence that salespeople processing information
with this strategy provide a set of justifications which incorporate the evaluation of many
unweighted attributes rather than just one.
The salesperson in the following encounter signals that he processed information
across several attributes (quality of materials, burner sizes/expandability, and warming
center). Further, he links those attributes to a need or preference of the customer (“you
said four nights a week you’re doing your cooking on a cooktop”). This signals that the
two products he recommends (both from the same manufacturer) ranked highest across
several unweighted attributes that fit the customer’s needs:
Salesperson: [Manufacturer’s] products are not, you know, plastic.
Some of the other guys that I’ve seen out there who have plastic
outside, and then, they just put metal on the inside just to keep it
weighty. So, this is real metal. I mean it’s—you said four nights a
week you’re doing your cooking on your cook top, you know, these
have lots of expandability. So again, you can go from the small to
medium size or from a medium to a large, it’s also about the
warming center. So, you can do things like keep things at a simmer.
Similar to the self-other lexicographic strategy, use of a self-other equal weight
strategy suggests that a salesperson has uncovered multiple needs and preferences of a
customer. Thus, it is likely that a salesperson who is maximizing accuracy would be
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better equipped to process information via a self-other strategy. Furthermore,
incorporating customer needs allows the salesperson to share blame with the customer if
the best product is not recommended. Therefore, salespeople who are maximizing
accuracy or minimizing negative emotion are more likely to use a self-other strategy than
salespeople who are driven to simplify the process for themselves and do not uncover
customer needs (i.e., minimizing effort, maximizing ease of justification). Based on the
preceding arguments, we present the following proposition:

P8:

Salespeople who use a self-other equal weight recommendation
strategy are likely to have maximizing accuracy as an underlying
goal.

3.4.2.5 Product Homogenization
An additional strategy for information processing emerged from our study which
is in sharp contrast to previous literature on decision-making strategies. A product
homogenization strategy is signaled by a salesperson processing (i.e., looking for) the
similarities among products rather than the differences, leading to justifications such “you
can’t go wrong with any of these,” or “they’re all good”. Our results suggest that
salespeople are surprisingly quick to homogenize the products they are selling and do so
at various points of the encounter. Here, a salesperson homogenizes products at the very
beginning of an encounter by stating that they all do the same thing (get hot):
Salesperson: Ranges don’t do a whole lot. They just get hot.
In a different encounter, the salesperson homogenizes products towards
the end of the conversation, when asked if there were any products to avoid:
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Customer: Are there any that we should stay away from, that you
would not recommend?
Salesperson: Well, they're all good. They all generally use the same
technology.
Use of the product homogenization strategy signals that the salesperson is
unwilling or unable to distinguish among the products available to sell to the customer.
As it is unlikely that someone specifically trained to sell appliances is unable to recognize
their differences, this strategy is more likely indicative of salespeople being unwilling to
distinguish among the products. A goal to maximize accuracy involves fitting products to
unique customer needs; thus, it is incongruent with a strategy which homogenizes the
products and makes it more difficult to find a customer-product fit. A goal to maximize
ease of justification suggests that a salesperson is driven to evaluate products based on
how easy they are to justify (i.e., differentiate) to a customer; thus, by definition, this goal
would not be indicative of homogenizing products. Alternatively, a minimizing effort
goal is suited to a homogenization strategy because it involves little time or energy.
Minimizing negative emotion is the manifestation of deflecting the responsibility, and
potential blame, of making a recommendation. Thus, salespeople minimizing negative
emotion may eschew the responsibility associated with evaluating or ranking the
differences among products. Based on the preceding logic, we propose the following:

P9:

Salespeople who use a product homogenization recommendation
strategy are likely to have minimizing effort and minimizing
negative emotion as underlying goals.
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3.4.2.6 Strategy Discussion
Although there are some similarities between the strategies we surface and those
identified in the self decision-making literature, there are also several notable differences.
First, among those salespeople that integrated customer needs, there was a surprising lack
of attribute weighting. Most known decision-making strategies involve identifying
attributes of interest and the unique weighting of the importance of those attributes (Lu,
Xie, and Xu 2012; Kray 2000; Kray and Gonzalez 1999), such that products can be
scored and ranked. For example, a customer may evaluate a product based on the number
of burners, presence of a warming drawer, and customer ratings, with customer ratings
being the most important among those three (i.e., weighted adding strategy). Because all
three attributes can exist on multiple similar products, it is important to determine which
attribute is most important to the customer in order to reach a final recommendation.
Surprisingly, there were no instances out of 71 encounters in which the salesperson asked
the author which attribute was most important in purchasing a range (e.g., “What is the
main thing you’re looking for in a range?”). By ignoring which attributes are most
important to the customer, the salesperson limits the use of the many known weightbased strategies (e.g., weighted adding, satisficing, etc.).
Second, the extant self decision-making literature tends to rely on types of
strategies as the signal for the goal being pursued (e.g., Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998).
For example, use of a weighted-adding strategy signals an underlying goal to maximize
accuracy. We take a similar approach, but suggest that the locus of strategies can signal
underlying recommendation goals, more so than type. For example, we propose that
maximizing accuracy gives way to both self-other lexicographic and equal weight
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strategies because the salesperson incorporates customer needs, whereas minimizing
effort gives way to both self lexicographic and equal weight strategies because the
salesperson does not take time to uncover customer needs. This provides further evidence
for the importance of understanding the locus of strategy in the recommendation process.
Third, the vast majority of salespeople we observed relied on self (reflective of
their own preferences), rather than self-other (reflective of customer preferences),
strategies. This is surprising given that these salespeople are employed to help customers
choose the product that best fits the customer’s needs. This suggests that, despite
conversations with customers, salespeople often revert back to products that possess
attributes of importance to themselves. The strategies used by salespeople to process
information give way to the recommendation they ultimately provide. Next, we discuss
the various types of recommendations provided by salespeople.
3.4.3

Recommendation
A recommendation is a salesperson’s suggestion of a product or products to a

customer. Three distinct types of recommendations emerged from our study: definitive
recommendation (salesperson suggests a single product to the customer), narrowed
recommendation (salesperson suggests a limited set of products to the customer), and
recommendation refusal (salesperson is unable or unwilling to suggest a product or
products to the customer). The addition of narrowed recommendations complements
consumer research which identifies two types of choices: choice (i.e., customer purchases
dominant product) or no choice (i.e., customer does not make a purchase or delays the
purchase until more information can be evaluated) (Dhar 1997; Dhar and Simonson
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2003). In consumer research, the choice and no choice options are typically assessed by
presenting a subject with a choice decision and measuring their likelihood of purchasing
a product or actual product selection (e.g., Dhar and Simonson 2003).
Observation of the narrowed and refusal recommendation types are consistent
with prior research which suggests that having to justify an evaluation of products to
other people, rather than just to oneself, results in a less selective decision (i.e., less
definitive) (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998). For example, a salesperson needing to
justify his recommendation to a customer may limit his willingness to make a definitive
one. Thus, a salesperson may propose a set of products (narrowed recommendation) or
recommend no products at all (recommendation refusal). In this study, we explicitly
asked each salesperson for a recommendation.
3.4.3.1 Definitive Recommendation
Salespeople providing a definitive recommendation suggest a single product to
the customer. Although salespeople may have demonstrated or shown preferences
towards multiple products throughout the process, they ultimately recommend a single
product (Biehal and Chakravarti 1983). Dhar (1997) suggests that the ability to arrive at a
definitive choice is a result of being able to recognize the differences among the products,
which is made easier when the products vary in their attributes and attractiveness (i.e.,
weighting) on those attributes. Trained salespeople should be able to recognize the
differences among the products they sell, and weigh the importance of particular
attributes based on self or self-other preferences. In the following encounter, the
salesperson provides a definitive recommendation:
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Salesperson: You may want to read up on convection. This
[manufacturer- which has convection] has a better price.
Customer: The [manufacturer]?
Salesperson: This [manufacturer] has a better price…This is my
choice.
Similarly, in a different encounter, the salesperson had shown preference to a
particular manufacturer’s products throughout the conversation and consequently
provided a definitive recommendation for a particular model from that manufacturer:
Customer: Is there a particular [manufacturer] model that you
recommend?
Salesperson: Yeah, this one over here.
A definitive recommendation relies on one product emerging as the dominant
alternative among a set of products. This implies that the salesperson evaluated the
differences among the products, making it unlikely that they utilized a product
homogenization strategy. Alternatively, processing via a lexicographic or equal weight
strategy signals that a single attribute (lexicographic) or multiple attributes (equal weight)
have been evaluated based on the salesperson’s (self) or the customer’s (self-other)
preferences. Therefore, if a product ranks highest on a single attribute or outscores all
other products across several unweighted attributes, then a dominant product can emerge
among the set of all available products. Thus, we propose the following:

P10:

Salespeople who process information via a self lexicographic, self
equal weight, self-other lexicographic, or self-other equal weight
strategy are likely to provide a definitive recommendation.
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3.4.3.2 Narrowed Recommendation
A salesperson providing a narrowed recommendation suggests a limited set of
products to the customer. This recommendation type emerged when salespeople
suggested two to three products without preference to a single product, even if explicitly
asked. We observed that salespeople were oftentimes able to differentiate products such
that a small set was dominant relative to others, but were unable or unwilling to
differentiate them any further. This was the case if the salesperson failed to ask the
customer how they weigh the importance of individual attributes. One salesperson
illustrates a narrowed recommendation type for two different products:

Salesperson: Alright, I would probably go with this [pointing to a
range] or that [pointing to a different range].
A different salesperson narrowed down her recommendation to two products from
different manufacturers. She could potentially narrow her recommendation further based
on the response to her statement about other appliances in the house, but glosses over it
and ultimately reiterates her narrowed recommendation:
Customer: Okay. Is this one that you recommend?
Salesperson: I would. I mean I would recommend this one
[pointing] or this one [pointing]. Depends on other appliances you
have in the house. [Manufacturer A] is good. [Manufacturer B’s] are
actually good as well. You have your warming all up here. It pretty
much works in the same way. Both of them are self-cleaned so no
cleaning at all. This one here has three trays at the bottom. Then that
one has these trays here.
A narrowed recommendation does not rely on the emergence of a single product
as the dominant alternative. Instead, multiple products that possess similar scores across
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the attributes of interest may be recommended. Processing via a self, or self-other equal
weight strategy likely results in a set of products that contain similar scores on the
multiple attributes of interest largely to the salesperson (self) or customer (self-other).
However, when a lexicographic strategy is used, a single dominant product ultimately
emerges. Thus, it is unlikely that a salesperson would recognize a single dominant
product, yet recommend multiple. Furthermore, a narrowed recommendation signals that
a set of products have emerged which may be similar to each other, but differ from other
products; thus, it is unlikely that a salesperson processing information via a product
homogenization strategy in which several products are deemed similar would provide a
narrowed recommendation. Therefore, we propose the following:

P11:

Salespeople who process information via a self equal weight or
self-other equal weight strategy are likely to provide a narrowed
recommendation.

3.4.3.3 Recommendation Refusal
A salesperson refusing to provide a recommendation is unable or unwilling to
suggest a product or products to the customer. Rational theory suggests when no
dominant alternative emerges from a set, it can be difficult or unreasonable to make a
choice (e.g., Dhar 1997; Karni and Schwarz 1977; Tversky and Shafir 1992). Likewise, a
salesperson’s unwillingness to propose a product, despite being asked to do so, may be
the result of perceiving no dominant product(s) to recommend, or of avoiding the task of
determining the dominant product(s). It is unlikely that trained salespeople are unable to
recognize a dominant product or products to fit the customer’s needs from among the
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available products; however, it is likely that they may be unwilling to do so if they are
avoiding responsibility. This point is made clear in the following encounter:

Customer: Which one would you recommend?
Salesperson: Well, I really, I couldn’t make that decision for you.
In a different encounter, the salesperson spent several minutes demonstrating the
features of a particular model offered by Manufacturer A. In fact, he did not look at, or
make reference to, any other models throughout the conversation. However, when
directly asked if that is the model he recommends, he ultimately refuses to make a
recommendation, minimizes the differences between them, and deflects back to the
customer:
Customer: So then do you recommend this [manufacturer A]?
Salesperson: Well, I don't really recommend anybody. It's your
preference. They’re all good. It's just a matter of your preference.
When a salesperson processes information via a product homogenization strategy,
she minimizes the differences among the products such that no product appears to be
better than any other. Therefore, the salesperson is likely unwilling to propose a product
or products to the customer. Alternatively, lexicographic and equal weight strategies
indicate that a salesperson processes information about the attribute(s) of interest for each
product, resulting in either a dominant product or set of products. Thus, it is unlikely that
a salesperson would recognize a dominant product or products and not recommend them
to the customer. Based on this logic, we propose the following:

P12:

Salespeople who process information via a product
homogenization strategy are likely to provide a recommendation
refusal.
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3.5

Recommendation Accuracy
The development of a recommendation process gives rise to important questions

regarding its use, such as, “Are there particular recommendation goals that are more
likely to result in better recommendations? How can customers determine whether or not
they are receiving a good recommendation?” Answers to these questions would help
customers determine the value they place on a recommendation. As evidenced by the
recommendation of 31 different products in this study, there is oftentimes a discrepancy
between what a salesperson recommends and what they should have recommended based
on the customer’s needs. Thus, we define recommendation accuracy as the extent to
which the product(s) suggested by a salesperson fits the customer’s needs.
To the best of our knowledge, previous research on self-other decision-making
has not linked recommendations to their objective accuracy. Therefore, we make an
initial attempt to better understand the impact of the recommendation process on
recommendation accuracy by linking the goals of a salesperson with third-party accuracy
data. We emphasize the link of goals to accuracy rather than strategies or
recommendation types for three reasons. First, goals are likely to be salient and
identifiable to customers based on the communication signals we surface. Second, goals
drive the rest of the recommendation process and, thus, are likely to have an underlying
impact on the accuracy resulting from other steps of the process. Lastly, because
recommendation accuracy can be a function of the path from goals to strategies to
recommendations (i.e., 60 possible paths), it would be premature with our qualitative data
to link accuracy to one or more of these paths.
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We draw upon Consumer Reports as a third-party, objective assessment of
recommendation accuracy (Appendix A2.4). The accuracy measure presented here is a
reflection of whether or not the salesperson’s recommendation fell within the list of top
ten products generated by Consumer Reports. The top ten list was generated based on a
set of product parameters entered by the authors, which mirrors the predetermined
responses used in the participant observation encounters (Table 3.2). For example, if a
salesperson asked for the budget, the author told them it was $1,000; thus, one of the
parameters used to generate the list of products in Consumer Reports was a budget of
$1,000. In total, these ten products were ranked one through six due to ties within the top
ten (e.g., there were three products that tied for first place). Of the 71 encounters, 14 were
removed from this analysis due to the salesperson refusing to provide a recommendation.
Of the remaining 57 cases, we provide the total count of salespeople signaling a
particular goal, along with the percentage of those salespeople who recommend a product
in the top ten, and the percentage of salespeople who recommend a product that is not in
the top ten (Table 3.4). If the salesperson provided a narrowed recommendation of two or
more products, both products had to be in the top ten in order to be counted as a top ten
recommendation. Note, some salespeople signaled more than one goal; thus, the total
count of goal pursuance is greater than the total number of salespeople examined.
The summary statistics of recommendation accuracy are shown in Table 3.4. The
results suggest that salespeople pursuing goals to maximize accuracy or minimize
negative emotion have a higher percentage of top ten recommendations than salespeople
pursuing goals to minimize effort or maximize ease of justification. It is not surprising
that a goal to maximize accuracy has the highest frequency of top ten recommendations
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given that they are driven to uncover the most accurate product. What is surprising, is
that the frequency of top ten recommendations is not higher than observed (61%) among
those salespeople. This indicates that of salespeople driven to recommend an accurate
product, 39% did not reach the top ten products. Furthermore, the findings suggest that
goals to minimize effort and maximize ease of justification resulted in top ten
recommendations in 48% and 45% of the observations, respectively. This relatively high
level of accuracy is surprising given that both of these goals are associated with spending
less time uncovering customer needs. This finding may reflect a salesperson’s luck in
randomly selecting an ‘accurate’ product, or it may suggest that a salesperson’s implicit,
snap judgement of customer needs and product fit can be fairly reliable, as opposed to the
more lengthy process of uncovering needs and matching them to products. A goal to
minimize negative emotion resulted in a top ten recommendation in 56% of the
observations, which is surprising given that these salespeople shy away from the
responsibility of recommending to the point that they often deflect it back to the
customer, yet were not far from the frequency of those salespeople maximizing accuracy.
Ideally, recommendation accuracy would be measured post-purchase by
customers who bought the oven actually recommended by their salesperson to determine
the extent to which the salesperson’s recommendation fit their unique needs. Due to the
design of the study in which no purchases were made, we used Consumer Reports as a
proxy for recommendation accuracy. However, there are several limitations associated
with using Consumer Reports. First, the process used by Consumer Reports to weight
attributes in generating final rankings is not provided. The scores assigned per attribute
and the weighting of attributes by Consumer Reports do not likely map perfectly onto a
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customer’s scoring and weighting of attributes (or the salesperson’s interpretation of the
customer’s weighting). Second, the three retailers in the study sold all of the
manufacturers’ products generated by the Consumer Reports rankings; however, due to
the design of the study, it was not possible to ‘covertly’ verify that each of the top ten
products were present on the floor at the time of the encounter. Note, all definitive or
narrowed recommendations were for products shown on the retail floor, despite an
extensive inventory available online. Thus, presence on the floor is likely to influence the
product(s) recommended by a salesperson. Third, a few salespeople directly referred to
Consumer Reports throughout the encounter as a source of information regarding the
products. This may skew their recommendations towards better approximating the
accuracy provided by Consumer Reports rather than approximating what best fits
customer needs. Lastly, the retailers had an average of 13 products on the floor (range of
6-21); therefore, if those floor models were selected by management based on Consumer
Reports for a general set of popular parameters, then it is likely that by recommending
any of the floor models, the recommendation would fall within the top ten.
3.6

General Discussion
In the opening vignette, we follow Lucy as she receives product recommendations

from two salespeople from the same retail chain. Surprisingly, despite consistent product
needs, product knowledge, and physical appearance, she is recommended two very
different products. Why did that happen? What process did these two salespeople follow
when making these different recommendations? The present research begins to address
these heretofore unanswered questions and, in doing so, contributes to the self-other
decision-making literature in the following ways.
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This research inductively generates a self-other decision-making process with
which salespeople provide a recommendation to a customer. Our observations suggest
three steps in the process: goals, strategies, and recommendations. In the first step,
salespeople are motivated by four recommendation goals: maximizing accuracy,
minimizing effort, minimizing negative emotions, and maximizing the ease of
justification. In comparison to the self decision-making process, our observations suggest
that these goals differ with respect to their prevalence. Self decision-makers tend to be
driven more often by maximizing accuracy or minimizing effort (Bettman, Luce, and
Payne 1998), whereas our study indicates that self-other decision-makers are driven more
often by minimizing negative emotions and maximizing ease of justification.
Furthermore, unlike self decision-making in which goals are signaled by the use of
particular strategies (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998), we propose that goals can be
signaled by communication facets. Thus, we provide an additional way to infer
underlying self-other decision-making goals.
In addition, we uncovered a novel way in which salespeople cope with a goal of
minimizing their negative emotions. Retail salespeople were surprisingly quick to
minimize their responsibility with the recommendation process and hence, minimize their
negative emotions, by deflecting responsibility back to the customer. Unlike customer
purchase decisions in which a customer knows they have full responsibility for the
decisions they make (i.e., online purchasing, grocery shopping), customers approach a
salesperson to shift partial responsibility of the decision-making process. Thus, it is
somewhat surprising that salespeople, whose job it is to help customers make good
choices, deflect responsibility back to the customer. Such deflection of responsibility can
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complicate the process and confuse customers, such that the customer may be hesitant to
make a purchase.
We also identify five strategies that salespeople use to process information.
Lexicographic and equal weight strategies are consistent with previous research.
However, our research suggests that these two strategies can be further categorized by
their locus – as either self (processing based on the salesperson’s preferences) or selfother (processing based largely on the customer’s preferences). Interestingly, we
frequently observed salespeople who reverted back to a “self” decision-making strategy,
regardless of what occurred during the customer-salesperson encounter. For instance,
despite discussing customer needs earlier in the conversation, a salesperson reverted back
to recommending a particular product he preferred because of its modern ‘look’. This
implies that salespeople may substantially discount what customers say in favor of their
own preferences (i.e., the salesperson’s self decision-making process). Thus, salespeople
can complicate the decision-making process for customers who are seeking
recommendations based on their needs – not the salesperson’s preferences. This finding
is consistent with the false-consensus effect, which suggests that individuals overestimate
the extent to which others hold the same beliefs and opinions as they do (Bauman and
Geher 2002; Marks and Miller 1987; Ross, Greene, and House 1977). Thus, salespeople
likely overestimate the extent to which others will prefer the same products they do and
project their preferences onto the customer.
We also observed an additional recommendation strategy, product
homogenization, which prior research has not identified. Surprisingly, our findings
revealed that salespeople across all three retailers were quick to homogenize products
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despite the wide range of products and manufacturers represented on the floor. Unlike
self decision-making strategies in which customers attempt to differentiate products, the
product homogenization strategy consists of salespeople attempting to make products
seem more similar. Thus, this strategy also complicates the decision-making process by
making it more difficult for customers to recognize a dominant product to purchase. In
fact, customers may be less likely to purchase any product if they do not feel confident
that the salesperson can recognize a dominant one to fit their needs.
The final step of the process involves the recommendation a salesperson provides
to the customer. Our data suggest three types of recommendations: definitive (i.e.,
recommend a single product), narrowed (i.e., recommend a limited set of products), and
refusal (i.e., no products are recommended). Surprisingly, we find that customers seeking
a salesperson recommendation often fail to get one (as a result of a narrowed
recommendation or recommendation refusal). Thus, customers are often left with the
need to spend additional time considering products.
3.7

Implications
This research has implications for manufacturers, retailers, and customers. Given

the frequency with which retail salespeople reverted back to decision-making strategies
that reflect their personal preferences, manufacturers should (continue to) focus on
training and familiarizing downstream retail salespeople with their particular products.
Doing so should enhance salespeople’s preferences for particular products which, not
surprisingly, often manifests itself in a recommendation to customers. Furthermore,
manufacturers can increase the likelihood of their products being differentiated from
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competitors rather than homogenized with competitors by emphasizing unique attributes
and innovative features through hands-on demonstrations and training that compares
products rather than lists features of a particular product.
A conundrum occurs for retailers, however. Although retailers may appreciate the
(free) manufacturer-specific training their salespeople receive, such a benefit may come
at the expense of salespeople recommending products based on their product familiarity
and personal preferences developed during training. Salesperson favoritism to a particular
product or manufacturer may result in subpar recommendations for many customers,
which can lower customer satisfaction and repeat purchases. Furthermore, salesperson
favoritism toward particular products or manufactures may even disrupt retailers’
relationships with upstream manufacturers who expect fair consideration from retail
salespeople.
Retailers should also recognize the lack of consistency among and across
salespeople making product recommendations to customers. Despite presumably
consistent sales training by retailers, our research indicates that salespeople are likely to
approach recommendations based on their own mental models (e.g., Wind 2006).
Notably, salespeople from one of the retailers in this study had a worksheet to guide them
through the sales process; however, those salespeople utilized self information processing
strategies with the same frequency of salespeople from other retailers. This implies that
training, or other instruments to improve the recommendation process (i.e., the
worksheets), may be effective in teaching salespeople a sales process (e.g., what
information to provide to customers), but not a recommendation process (e.g., what
questions to ask, or how to incorporate customer needs into the recommendation
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process). Thus, retailers should consider monitoring the extent to which a salesperson’s
customer encounters reflects their sales training. For example, retailers may incorporate
mystery shopping into their regular evaluation process to examine how readily
salespeople uncover customer needs and integrate them throughout the recommendation
process.
Our research also suggests that retail salespeople frequently provide narrowed
recommendations, or no recommendations at all. From a retailer’s perspective, this can
be problematic because it shifts decision-making responsibility back onto customers who
may decide against making a choice altogether. Note, the salespeople across the three
retailers in this study were not on commission. Thus, although customer concerns about
recommendations based on higher commission products are reduced in our setting,
salespeople may be less likely to make a recommendation when there is no financial
motivation to do so. As such, non-commission retailers should reconsider the pros and
cons of providing some form of bonus to salespeople (i.e., flat rate reward for selling any
product). Doing so may help shift task-oriented sellers into more outcome-oriented sellers
(e.g., Anderson and Oliver 1987; Cravens et al. 1993), thereby increasing the likelihood
that retail salespeople make definitive recommendations, and customers make a choice.
Finally, customers should be cognizant that salespeople oftentimes make
inaccurate recommendations, particularly when they are not linking the discussion of
products and justifications of their recommendation to customer needs.
Recommendations based on salesperson preferences rather than customer preference can
result in conflicting recommendations among salespeople even within the same retailer.
This suggests that simply by arriving ten minutes later, a customer may be approached by
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a different salesperson and be provided a completely different recommendation.
Customers can minimize this concern by being forthright with their preferences and
needs, and taking steps to ensure that a true self-other recommendation is provided. For
example, if a customer requests a recommendation by stating, “Based on our
conversation, which product do you think would be best for me?”, there is a greater
chance of a self-other recommendation being provided than if a customer simply asks,
“Which product do you recommend?”
3.8

Limitations and Further Research Directions
As with most studies, this study has its strengths as well as its limitations. For

instance, the design of this study allowed the authors to surface only those things that the
salesperson outwardly portrayed or discussed. Also, salespeople were not directly asked
about their goals or motivations or how they processed information that lead to their
recommendation. This information would likely have been heavily filtered if asked in a
natural setting. Indeed, prior to “going undercover”, we interviewed several retail
salespeople about the recommendation process. Not surprisingly, each salesperson
conveyed that their goal was to provide the best solution for a customer’s needs (i.e.,
maximize accuracy).
In addition, the participant observations were designed to capture the
salesperson’s recommendation process when a customer has little knowledge of the
products. This was necessary in order to observe salespeople’s complete approach for
evaluating all alternatives, presenting information, and recommending a product.
However, it is common that customers have varying degrees of knowledge regarding the
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products based on previous experience or product research. In that case, the
recommendation process may shift from providing a recommendation based on depth
and/or breadth of knowledge to the customer seeking confirmation that a choice that they
have already made is the best one. For example, if a customer came in to purchase a
particular range they had seen in Consumer Reports, they may ask the salesperson if that
model is a good one. This would likely change the salesperson’s recommendation process
because they are now anchored on what the customer appeared to prefer. Additionally, a
customer with prior product knowledge may lessen a salesperson’s guilt associated with
the responsibility of recommending a product because they sense that the customer is
playing a more active role in the decision process and blame sharing. Thus, further
research could explore how the customer’s prior knowledge of the products, and the
extent to which they have already made a choice, impacts the salesperson’s
recommendation behavior.
Along similar lines, our study design ensured that the customer (i.e., author) did
not portray a particular goal. For example, while it is assumed that a customer is seeking
the best possible product recommendation, the customer never explicitly said she was
trying to make the best choice (i.e., maximize accuracy), minimize her effort with the
choice, minimize the negative emotions she was experiencing with the choice, or find the
easiest product to justify. Thus, this research does not capture the interplay of the
salesperson’s recommendation process and the customer’s decision-making process.
Dissimilar goals between customers and salespeople may lead to a less effective
recommendation process, as well as customer frustration. For example, if a customer is
driven to minimize her effort but a salesperson is driven to minimize his negative
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emotions, the customer would likely grow frustrated when the salesperson deflects
responsibility back to the customer, whose intention was to minimize her time and
energy.
Similarly, this study does not capture the interplay of conflicting salesperson and
customer strategies. A customer may process information about many attributes with
varying degrees of importance (i.e., equal weight strategy); however, the salesperson may
anchor on the importance of one attribute (i.e., lexicographic). For this study, we focus on
understanding the salesperson’s recommendation process and attempt to control for the
customer decision-making process. However, further research should consider the
interplay of these two processes.
Finally, this study emphasizes the recommendation process of retail (business-toconsumer) salespeople engaged in a one-time sales encounter with a customer. While we
expect our research to generalize across contexts, previous research suggests that goals
constantly fluctuate (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998). As such, the recommendation
process may vary in the case of multiple sales encounters (e.g., three encounters with the
same car salesperson) or long-term business-to-business relationships (e.g., weekly
meetings over the course of a year for a large-scale project). Therefore, further research
may consider the impact of encounter frequency (Mohr and Nevin 1990) on the
recommendation process.
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3.9

Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Encounter Log
(Showing the first 24 Encounters)
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Encounter ID Retail Chain
B
1
C
2
B
3
B
4
C
5
B
6
C
7
A
8
B
9
C
10
A
11
B
12
C
13
C
14
B
15
C
16
B
17
C
18
A
19
A
20
B
21
C
22
C
23
B
24

Address
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia

Salesperson
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity

Age
30-60
> 60
30-60
30-60
30-60
> 60
30-60
< 30
> 60
30-60
< 30
30-60
> 60
> 60
30-60
30-60
> 60
> 60
< 30
30-60
30-60
30-60
> 60
> 60

Race
AA
A
W
W
W
W
AA
W
W
W
W
AA
W
AA
AA
AA
W
W
W
AA
W
W
W
W

Sex
F
M
M
F
M
F
F
M
F
M
M
F
M
F
F
M
M
M
M
F
M
M
M
M

Options Recommended Brand(s)
Time
Date
Removed for annonymity
12
18-Jun 7:18 AM
Removed for annonymity
15
18-Jun 7:38 AM
Removed for annonymity
16
18-Jun 8:24 AM
Removed for annonymity
10
18-Jun 8:48 AM
Removed for annonymity
15
18-Jun 9:35 AM
Removed for annonymity
10
18-Jun 9:58 AM
Removed for annonymity
10
18-Jun 10:58 AM
Removed for annonymity
12
18-Jun 11:49 AM
Removed for annonymity
10
18-Jun 12:15 PM
Removed for annonymity
16
18-Jun 1:02 PM
Removed for annonymity
13
18-Jun 1:50 PM
Removed for annonymity
18-Jun 2:21 PM
Removed for annonymity
19
18-Jun 2:51 PM
Removed for annonymity
14
18-Jun 3:28 PM
Removed for annonymity
18-Jun 4:15 PM
Removed for annonymity
15
18-Jun 5:06 PM
Removed for annonymity
18-Jun 5:52 PM
Removed for annonymity
18-Jun
Removed for annonymity
11
18-Jun 6:39 PM
Removed for annonymity
13
18-Jun 8:23 PM
Removed for annonymity
10
25-Jun 8:08 AM
Removed for annonymity
21
25-Jun 8:52 AM
Removed for annonymity
10
25-Jun 9:21 AM
Removed for annonymity
10
25-Jun 9:50 AM

Recommended Model(s)
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity
Removed for annonymity

Table 3.2: Systematic Response Guide

Question

Systematic Response

Power (Electric vs. Gas)

Electric

Metal/Finish

Stainless Steel

Budget

Approximately $1000

Cooking Habits

4 times per week

Baking Habits

1 time per month

Large Family Meal Preparation

Only around holidays

Other appliances/ desire to match

No need to match existing (no other
manufacturers mentioned) because all
appliances will eventually be replaced,
starting with the range

Prior knowledge about particular features

None

Current manufacturer

Relatively new home- hadn’t paid
attention to current model
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Table 3.3: Communication Facets Signaling Recommendation Goals

Maximize
Accuracy
(P1)
Long

Goal
Minimize
Maximize
Minimize
Negative
Ease of
Effort
Emotion Justification
(P2)
(P3)
(P4)

X

Duration
Short

X

X

X

Unilateral

X

X

X

Communication Facet

Directionality
Bilateral

X

Informal

X

X

Tone
Formal
Focus
(Emphasis
on)
Objectivity
(Emphasis
on)
Feature-Need
Linkage
(Emphasis
on)

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Features

X

Evaluations

X

X

Objective

X

X

Subjective
Linked

X

Unlinked

X
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Table 3.4: Recommendation Accuracy Frequencies

Top 10

Other

Goal

Total
Count

Count

Percentage

Count

Percentage

Maximize
Accuracy

18

11

61%

7

39%

Minimize Effort

21

10

48%

11

52%

Minimize
Negative Emotion

16

9

56%

7

44%

Maximize Ease of
Justification

33

15

45%

18

55%
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Figure 3.1: Recommendation Strategies
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Figure 3.2: Disguise and Equipment
Neon pink hat:

Audio-recording device attached to keychain:

Shopping List:
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Figure 3.3: Typical Retail Layout
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Figure 3.4: Recommendation Process Model
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4

Conclusion
In this dissertation, we sought to contribute to the sales and sales management

literature, as well as self-other decision-making literature by examining the
recommendation behavior of multi-line salespeople. In the first essay, we draw upon the
control systems framework, as well as the legitimacy literature and social learning theory
to examine external controls and explain why salespeople may recommend a particular
manufacturer’s products to customers relative to competitors’ products. In the second
essay, we integrated field observations and previous literature across disciplines to
examine the process of how salespeople make recommendations for customers.
The theoretical framework of the first essay is tested using a unique data set
compiled from three different sources (salespeople, sales managers, and manufacturer
objective sales data) across two hierarchical levels (salespeople and sales managers) and
across many distributors. To estimate the model, we used Mplus version 7 (Muthén and
Muthén 2012) because of its ability to analyze complex hierarchical models using full
maximum likelihood estimation. We first fit a baseline model with only the effects of
salesperson external controls on focused performance through focused effort (Table 2.5,
Model 1). We then created interaction terms by multiplying mean-centered salesperson
external controls by mean-centered manager external controls (Aiken and West 1991).
Then, we estimated the full hypothesized model, including the cross-level moderators
(Table 2.5, Model 2). Standard fit indexes were not available for comparing nested
models with Mplus; therefore, as is common practice, we compared the fit of these
models using a log-likelihood difference test (e.g., Hughes and Ahearne 2010; Wieseke et
al. 2012). The hypothesized model including cross-level moderators fits better than the
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nonmoderated model (Δχ2 = 26.48, Δd.f. [number of free parameters] = 16, p ≤ .05),
indicating that the inclusion of the Level 2 variables (i.e., manager external controls) into
the model predicts the outcome variables better than a model with only within-level
variables (i.e., salesperson external controls).
The results of the full hypothesized model indicated that manager external
outcome control positively interacts with salesperson external outcome control to
influence focused effort (β = .07, p ≤ .05), providing support for H1. H2 is also supported;
manager external behavior control positively interacts with salesperson external behavior
control to influence focused effort (β = .03, p ≤ .01). Manager external behavior control
has little impact on the relationship between salesperson external outcome control and
focused effort (β = –.01, n.s.); thus, H3 is not supported. However, in support of H4, the
results indicate that manager external outcome control negatively interacts with
salesperson external behavior control to influence focused effort (β = –.04, p ≤ .05).
Finally, focused effort is positively related to focused performance, in support of H5 (β =
.32, p ≤ .05).
Despite the prevalence of external controls in practice, prior research has mostly
focused on internal controls. Accordingly, we complement and extend the existing
controls literature by advancing the concept of external controls. In doing so, we make
three key contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to theory and empirical
research in the area of within-level control systems. Marketing scholars have made
significant contributions to the within-level internal control systems literature (e.g.,
Anderson and Oliver 1987; Jaworski 1988) (Table 2.2). However, a complementary
stream of research on within-level external control systems is missing. Second, although
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internal and external controls share some similarities, they we suggest an important way
in which they differ. Internal controls stem from employers, which obligates salespeople
to accede to their influence (e.g., Ouchi 1980). In contrast, external controls are
nonobligatory influences from an outside source. Thus, the freedom to accede to the
influence of external controls can give way to salespeople’s concerns about their
appropriateness and legitimacy. Third, we provide evidence that the impact of controls at
lower levels of analysis (e.g., salespeople) largely depends on the type of control at
higher levels of analysis (e.g., sales managers). This is because salespeople look to their
manager for cues to alleviate the tension they experience from external controls.
Correspondingly, we find that similar manager external controls have a reinforcing effect
on the salesperson’s external controls such that focused effort is enhanced. Notably,
however, increasing sales manager external outcome control undermines the relationship
between salesperson external behavior control and focused effort. This suggests that
external rewards to another person (e.g., sales manager) can undermine one’s own (e.g.,
salesperson) intrinsic motivation. Thus, we provide a potential “cross-level” extension to
cognitive evaluation theory, which suggests parallel effects at the within-level of analysis
(Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999). Taken together, these findings begin to address calls
from the literature to better understand how control systems interplay at different levels
of analysis (e.g., Coughlan and Joseph 2012; Krafft et al. 2012; Miao and Evans 2013).
The insights provided in the second essay are based on a grounded theory
approach (e.g, Glaser and Straus 1967; Spiggle 1994; Strauss 1987; Strauss and Corbin
1990). In particular, we covertly audio-recorded 71 sales encounters with retail
salespeople in their natural setting (i.e., retail stores), across 71 different locations of
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three different retail chains and four different states. Such an approach allowed the
salesperson-customer experience to unfold naturally (Belk, Sherry, and Wallendorf
1988), which affords a richer knowledge of the topic area and data that is not contrived
(Wilson 2001). Moreover, this approach lends credibility to our findings by producing
unfiltered, naturalistic data, which does not suffer from informants’ limited memory
recall (Finn 2001), discrepancies between reported and actual behavior, and a variety of
desirability biases that may occur with surveys, off-site interviews, and focus groups
(Friedrichs and Ludtke 1975). Audio-recordings of each of the 71 sales encounters were
transcribed for further analysis.
We independently read the entire set of transcripts to get a general sense for the
nature of the encounters (Spiggle 1994). Over numerous meetings, we discussed
emerging themes and patterns across the 71 encounters, and debated their distinctiveness
and relevance to the topic (Canniford and Shankar 2013; Celsi, Rose, and Leigh 1993;
Schouten and McAlexander 1995). An initial, overarching recommendation process
emerged which consisted of six large categories. Similar to Bone, Christensen, and
Williams (2014), Holt (1995), and McQuarrie, Miller, and Phillips (2013), we used the
iterative, constant comparison procedure to contrast and differentiate the categories, as
well as compare them to existing literature across disciplines (Glaser 1956). As a result of
this procedure, the original six categories were collapsed into a three-step process model
consisting of goals, strategies, and recommendations. We refined the dimensions of each
step (i.e., the five different strategies within the strategy step) through reference to
literature and our field study (e.g., Schilpzand, Hekman, and Mitchell 2014).
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This research inductively generates a self-other decision-making process with
which salespeople provide a recommendation. Our observations suggest three steps in the
process: goals, strategies, and recommendations. In the first step, salespeople are
motivated by four recommendation goals: maximizing accuracy, minimizing effort,
minimizing negative emotions, and maximizing the ease of justification. In comparison to
the self decision-making process, our findings suggest that these goals differ with respect
to their prevalence. Self decision-makers tend to be driven more often by maximizing
accuracy or minimizing effort (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998), whereas our results
indicate that self-other decision-makers are driven more often by minimizing negative
emotions and maximizing ease of justification. Furthermore, unlike self decision-making
in which goals are signaled by the use of particular strategies (Bettman, Luce, and Payne
1998), we propose that goals can be signaled by communication facets. Thus, we provide
an additional way to infer underlying self-other decision-making goals.
Based on observation, we also identify five strategies that salespeople use to
process information. Lexicographic and equal weight strategies are consistent with
previous research. However, our research suggests that these two strategies can be further
categorized by their locus – as either self (processing based on the salesperson’s
preferences) or self-other (processing based on the integration of the salesperson’ and
customer’s preferences).
We also observe and identify a fifth recommendation strategy, product
homogenization, which prior research has not identified. Surprisingly, our findings
revealed that salespeople across all three retailers were quick to homogenize products
despite the wide range of products and manufacturers represented on the floor. Unlike the
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known self decision-making strategies in which customers attempt to differentiate
products, the product homogenization strategy consists of salespeople attempting to make
products seem more similar. Thus, this strategy complicates the decision-making process
by making it more difficult for customers to recognize a dominant product to purchase. In
fact, customers may be less likely to purchase any product if they do not feel confident
that the salesperson can recognize a dominant one to fit their needs.
The final step of the process involves the recommendation a salesperson provides
to the customer. Our data suggest three types of recommendations: definitive (i.e.,
recommend a single product), narrowed (i.e., recommend a limited set of products), and
refusal (i.e., no products are recommended). Surprisingly, we find that customers seeking
a salesperson recommendation often fail to get one (as a result of a narrowed
recommendation or recommendation refusal). Thus, customers are often left with the
need to spend additional time considering products.
Through both of these dissertation essays we examine the recommendation
behavior of multi-line salespeople. In shedding light on this important topic area, several
areas of further research emerge. First, the recommendation behavior of salespeople (in a
business-to-business or business-to-consumer setting) is likely to have important
implications for distributors (and retailers). For example, when should distributors allow
manufacturers to provide rewards or training to their salespeople and sales managers? On
the one hand, a distributor may be hesitant to allow a manufacturer to intervene because it
does not want to relinquish control of salesperson behavior. Moreover, distributors may
fear that a salesperson’s partiality toward one manufacturer might result in subpar
customer solutions, lost profit, and alienation of other upstream manufacturer partners.
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On the other hand, distributors can benefit from manufacturers’ intervention because they
provide supplemental training and income to their employees, which may increase the
likelihood of recommendations actually being made, boost employee satisfaction and
reduce turnover. Thus, further research could address the trade-offs distributors (and
retailers) face when considering whether or not to allow manufacturer intervention with
their salespeople.
Second, distributors and retailers should recognize the lack of consistency with
which their salespeople make product recommendations to customers. In this dissertation,
we argue that two factors for this inconsistency may be external controls and variation in
the recommendation process. The first essay argues that, despite presumably consistent
sales training by the distributor, salespeople are influenced by external controls; thus,
they recommend (and sell) the products for which they are rewarded or trained by the
manufacturer to recommend. This finding suggests that recommendations may vary
simply based upon which manufacturer offers the highest salesperson and sales manager
SPIF that particular month. Furthermore, the second essay suggests that salespeople are
likely to approach recommendations based on their own mental models (e.g., Wind
2006). This implies that training to improve the extent to which salespeople provide
accurate recommendations may be effective in teaching salespeople a sales process (e.g.,
what information to provide to customers), but not a recommendation process (e.g., what
questions to ask, or how to incorporate customer needs into the recommendation
process). Thus, distributors and retailers should consider monitoring the extent to which
salesperson recommendations reflect the desires of management.
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Finally, customers should be cognizant that salespeople can make inaccurate
recommendations, particularly when they are being influenced by manufacturers or are
not linking the discussion of products and justifications of their recommendation to
customer needs. Customers (both business-to-business and business-to-consumer) can
minimize this concern by being forthright with their preferences and needs, taking steps
to ensure that a true self-other recommendation is provided (i.e., asking “What product do
you recommend for me?”), and uncovering potential biases which stem from external
controls.
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A1.2: IRB Approval

133

134

A1.3: Construct Measures
Focal Variables (loadings are in parentheses)
Salesperson external outcome control: collected from salesperson (α = .79); adapted from
Challagalla and Shervani (1996); five -point scale (“strongly disagree/strongly agree”)
(Manufacturer) and/or its field representative...
1. …provides me with significant compensation for selling its products. (.88)
2. …recognizes me when I do a good job selling its products. (.63)
3. …offers me substantial financial rewards for selling its products. (.83)

Salesperson external behavior control: collected from salesperson (α = .93); adapted
from Challagalla and Shervani (1996); five-point scale (“strongly disagree/strongly
agree”)
(Manufacturer) and/or its field representative…
1. …provides me with extensive product training. (.85)
2. …coaches me on how to sell its products. (.91)
3. …provides me with sales advice when we go on sales calls. (.88)
4. …evaluates the skills I use to sell (manufacturer) products. (.79)
5. …provides me with helpful suggestions on how to demonstrate benefits of their
products. (.90)

Sales manager external outcome control: collected from manager (α = .80); adapted from
Challagalla and Shervani (1996); five-point scale (“strongly disagree/strongly agree”)
(Manufacturer) and/or its field representative...
1. ...provides me with significant compensation when my salespeople sell its products.
(.95)
2. ...recognizes me when my salespeople do a good job selling its products. (.68)
3. ...offers me significant financial rewards for sales of its products by my salespeople.
(.74)

Sales manager external behavior control: collected from manager (α = .94); adapted from
Challagalla and Shervani (1996); five-point scale (“strongly disagree/strongly agree”)
(Manufacturer) and/or its field representative…
1. ...provides me with extensive product training. (.88)
2. ...coaches me on how to help my salespeople sell its products. (.91)
3. ...provides me with sales advice that I can use during sales calls with my salespeople.
(.93)
4. ...evaluates the skills I use to help my salespeople sell its products. (.81)
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5. ...provides me with helpful suggestions on how to demonstrate the benefits of their
products to my salespeople. (.89)

Focused effort: collected from manager; based on Rapp et al. (2010), Badrinarayanan and
Laverie (2011), Bonney and Williams (2009), Brown and Peterson (1994), Hughes and
Ahearne (2010), (α = .89); five-point scale (“strongly disagree/strongly agree”)
Relative to other manufacturers’ products that s/he is able to sell, this salesperson…
1. …frequently looks for opportunities to sell (manufacturer’s) products. (.86)
2. … proactively seeks out clients to whom they can propose (manufacturer’s) products.
(.95)
3. … make calls specifically to customers that might be interested in (manufacturer’s)
products. (.78)

Covariates
Manufacturer’s reputation: collected from salesperson, adapted from Badrinarayanan and
Laverie (2011) (α = .89); five-point scale (“strongly disagree/strongly agree”)
1. (Manufacturer) is a well-respected brand. (.94)
2. (Manufacturer) has a good reputation. (.93)
3. (Manufacturer) is a reputable company. (.78)

Number of manufacturers: collected from salesperson; adapted from Hughes and Ahearne
(2010)
1. How many different (product category) manufacturers’ products are you able to sell?

Salesperson experience: collected from salesperson; adapted from Fu, Richards, and
Jones (2009)
1. Years of sales experience.

Salesperson internal outcome control: collected from salesperson; adapted from
Challagalla and Shervani (1996) (α = .77), five-point scale (“strongly disagree/strongly
agree”)
1. I would get bonuses if I exceed my sales volume (.75)
2. Promotion opportunities depend on how well I perform on sales volume. (.66)
3. I would be recognized by my company if I perform well on sales volume. (.83)
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Salesperson internal behavior control: collected from salesperson; adapted from
Challagalla and Shervani (1996) (α = .93), five-point scale (“strongly disagree/strongly
agree”)
1. My manager has standards by which my selling skills are evaluated. (.74)
2. My supervisor periodically evaluates the selling skills I use to accomplish a task (e.g.,
how I negotiate). (.91)
3. My manager provides guidance on ways to improve selling skills and abilities. (.90)
4. My supervisor evaluates how I make sales presentations. (.91)
5. My manager assists by suggesting why using a particular sales approach may be
useful. (.89)
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A1.4: Popular Press Article

Article located at:
http://business.highbeam.com/5338/article-1G1-116151839/not-so-spiffy-don-richie-ceosolution-provider-sequel
Accessed: April 16, 2014
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A1.5: Job Descriptions
Employer: TireDiscounters
Job Description located at:
http://www.linkup.com/job/ee12038fcb647ed163f7d36e5f112874e1ad/tire-technicianjob-in-lexington-ky
Accessed: April 16, 2014

139

Employer: Empire Today, LLC
Job Description located at:
http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/jobdetails.aspx?APath=2.21.0.0.0&job_did
=JHS21M66QD62FCS98NG&sc_cmp1=js_jrp_jobclick&IPath=JRKV0A
Accessed: April 16, 2014
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A.2

Chapter 3 Appendix
A2.1: IRB Approval
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A2.2: Interview Guide

1. Which range do you recommend?
2. Why should we buy that one?
3. Do you typically recommend that one?
4. Why should we not buy some of these others?
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A2.3: Debriefing Script
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A2.4: Consumer Reports Appliance Testing Information
Source: http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/about-us/whats-behind-theratings/testing/appliances-home/index.htm
Accessed March 29, 2015
How we test: Appliances & Home products
Readers of Consumer Reports and ConsumerReports.org have plenty to say—last
year, 127,887 of our readers called, wrote, or e-mailed our customer-relations
department with comments and questions about the thousands of products we test
each year. In the home-and-garden area, they wondered about refrigerators that don't
keep food cold, dishwashers that drown out conversations, and funny-looking twisted
light bulbs that claim to save energy.
The occasional rhetorical question arrives in our inboxes, as in "What the heck were
you thinking?" (Actually, we get that genre of query pretty often, some of them not
suitable to print here.)
Here we address some of the common inquiries we get about how we test products
for the home. If you've got a question about a home-related product, send it to us
athome@cro.consumer.org.
How do you pick the models you test?
We try to test models that represent the spectrum of products in a given market. Our
analysts seek out products with new features and technological advances and a wide
range of prices. After they analyze market share, marketing strategy, and advertising
and promotional materials, they contact manufacturers to determine whether items
will be available for at least three months after a report is published. The analysts
then recommend a list of models that managers in our technical and editorial
divisions review.
During the next step, staff shoppers buy the products at retail outlets throughout the
Northeast—our offices are in the suburbs of New York City—or online, never
revealing that the purchases are for Consumer Reports. (We want to ensure that we
test the same products you'll buy.) When we need to buy best-selling regional brands,
we use shoppers across the country. Most significant, and unlike most other
publications, we buy everything we test.
In rare instances, when a product isn't in stores yet, we buy it from the manufacturer,
revealing this in our report. We'll subsequently test a version that we buy at retail and
report on those findings.
How do you test?
Our experts develop tests that re-create the experience you'll have with the product.
They also consider industry standards for testing a particular product. Note that those
tests usually gauge only a minimum level of performance while our tests aim to find
the highest-performing products. We develop tests for those products that lack
industry standards for ease of use.
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In some cases, an industry models its tests on ours. For example, we developed an
emissions test for vacuums that determines how much dirt and dust blows into the air
when a model is running. The industry then devised its own test that's based on ours,
and now that test is the industry standard.
What do you do if a product malfunctions or breaks during the test?
When either happens, we buy two more of the same product. If the new versions do
not exhibit the same problem and we suspect the original problem was a qualitycontrol issue, we base the results on the models that performed correctly. And we
chalk up the problem to an isolated issue. If either or both of the new samples
exhibits the same problems, we make a judgment on whether it is a flaw in quality
control or design and factor that into our Ratings.
A product-design flaw means that most consumers will experience problems with this
item, while quality-control issues—materials, assembly, packaging, shipping—
should not affect all of the products. (Watch our home product testing videos)
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